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"The ADA is a legislative Rorschach test, an inkblot whose meaning
and significance will be determined through years of costly litigation."
Senator William Armstrong, upon passage of the ADA by Congress'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Article is to discuss the unique ramifications
of Title 12 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)3 for employees suffering from bipolar disorder or clinical depression.4 Specifi136 CONG. REc. S9694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990). Senator Armstrong's statement has proven to be prophetic. Courts have witnessed a deluge of litigation during the more than six years that have passed since Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) became fully effective. It is also interesting to note Senator
Armstrong's use of imagery from the field of psychology - a choice that is uniquely
appropriate to the scope of this Article. Contrast Senator Armstrong's statement
with the following one made by President Bush when he signed the ADA into law:
"Fears that the ADA is too vague or too costly and will lead to an explosion of litigation are misplaced." 26 WEEKLY COMp. PREs. Doc. 1165 (July 30, 1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601.
Title I of the ADA is the subchapter of the statute that is applicable
to employment. The remaining subchapters cover public transportation and other state
and local government services (Title II), public accommodations (Title III), telecommunications (Title IV), and miscellaneous provisions (Title V).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
4 In this Article, the author broadly uses the terms "bipolar disorder"
and
"depression" (or "clinical depression") even though the American Psychiatric Association (APA) recognizes more specific categories of mood disorders within each of
these classifications. See generally the chapter on "Mood Disorders" in AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS

(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
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cally, this Article seeks to demonstrate that the reason these individuals are usually unsuccessful in litigating Title I claims is partly attributable to poor choices of legal strategy. In addition to presenting
support for this proposition, the author suggests alternative courses
of action for future litigants to follow in order to avoid the legal pitfalls of their predecessors.
This Article is divided into several parts. Part I begins with an
overview of bipolar disorder and depression to provide the nonmental health professional with a rudimentary understanding of
these two illnesses. It then continues by briefly discussing the history,
purpose, and basic tenets of the ADA. Part I concludes by examining
the role of the courts and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) in interpreting and applying this statute. Part
II proceeds to dissect Title I, analyzing each of its important components in an effort to give the reader an understanding of the more
prominent nuances to this complex statute. In particular, the analysis will focus on how Title I's major provisions apply to employees
who have bipolar disorder or depression. Part III recaps the major
obstacles faced by such employees under Title I and suggests what
changes - both by Congress and the EEOC as well as by future
plaintiff-employees - could possibly remedy this situation. Additionally, throughout the Article, special attention will be given to issues of statutory and regulatory interpretation that have generated
disagreement among various courts and the EEOC. Part IV concludes the Article by briefly reiterating that employees suffering from
mental illness, especially those suffering from bipolar disorder or depression, face a constant struggle when seeking protection under Title I's various provisions.
This Article does not purport to accomplish the following: First,
it does not attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of all the fine intricacies and legal controversies surrounding Title I of the ADA. The
progeny of case law that this statute has spawned is far too vast to be
adequately addressed in anything short of a treatise. Second, in contrast to most other commentators, the author has tried to limit discussion of the case law to controversies actually decided under the
ADA rather than its related predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 5 Nonetheless, several Rehabilitation Act cases are cited in this
5 See infra Parts I.B., I.C. (discussing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).

Most of
these articles were written shortly after the ADA was enacted. Consequently, the
commentators had to rely on Rehabilitation Act precedent for interpretations of
similar provisions under the ADA. However, as the number of decisions interpreting the ADA has continued to grow, the need for this reliance has diminished. In
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Article because of their particular relevance to the specific issue being discussed or because of a remaining lack of ADA cases on the
subject. Third, Tide I is primarily discussed in the context of individuals who are already employees. Although Title I also applies to
pre-employment screening, inquiries, and medical examinations,
these sections have been adequately addressed by other commentators and, therefore, will not be addressed in this Article. Fourth, the
author does not intend for this Article to serve as a step-by-step litigation handbook for prospective plaintiffs or their employers.6 Rather,
the author's goal is to provide an academic discourse in an area of
law that is becoming increasingly convoluted. A growing number of
decisions reflect conflicting interpretations among tribunals as to Title I's applicability to employees suffering from depression or bipolar
disorder.7 The author hopes, nonetheless, that an analysis of these
issues will provide practicing attorneys with the foundation upon
which to assess better the strengths and weaknesses of these types of
cases.
Why depression and bipolar disorder? Two reasons. First, these
two mood disorders are considered to be severely debilitating and
addition, for an excellent discussion of why Rehabilitation Act cases are not good
precedent for the ADA in any event, see generally Stephanie P. Miller, Keeping the
Promise: The ADA and Employment Discriminationon the Basis of PsychiatricDisability, 85
CAL. L. REV. 701 (1997).
6 The ADA involves a complex scheme of shifting burdens of proof, which are
too complex to be discussed within the relatively narrow framework of this Article.
See Loretta K. Haggard, Reasonable Accommodation of Individuals with Mental Disabilities and Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 43 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 343, 350 (1993) and Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566, 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1996) for a discussion and application of
the burdens of proof under the ADA, respectively. See also infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
See Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, 139 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1998)
(depression); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Amego, 110 F.3d 135,
148-49 (1st Cir. 1997) (depression); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 14
(1st Cir. 1997) (depression); Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir.
1997) (depression); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir.
1996) (bipolar disorder); Webb v. Mercey Hospital, 102 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir.
1996) (depression); Miller v. National Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1995)
(bipolar disorder); Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 968 F. Supp. 409, 416 (S.D. Ind.
1997) (depression); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 968 F. Supp. 1026, 1034-35
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (depression); Jerina v. Richardson Automotive, Inc., 960 F. Supp.
106, 109 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (depression); Motichek v. Buck Kreihs Co., Inc., 958 F.
Supp. 266, 269 (E.D. La. 1996) (depression); Husowitz v. Runyon, 942 F. Supp. 822,
832-33 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (bipolar disorder); Kotlowski v. Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F.
Supp. 790, 797 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (depression); Henry v. Guest Services, Inc., 902 F.
Supp. 245, 251 (D.D.C. 1995) (depression); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County,
905 F. Supp. 499, 506-07 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (depression); Parker v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (depression).
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relatively prevalent among the various types of possible mental disorders that afflict humans. 8 Therefore, they have serious consequences
for affected individuals as well as their employers. Second, although
there have been numerous commentaries about mentally disabled
individuals under the ADA, none has specifically focused on the two
disorders that are the subject of this Article." Other commentators
have chosen to focus on such mental illnesses as alcoholism, 0 pho-2
bias and anxiety disorders," and psychoactive substance abuse.
Consequently, the author hopes to add to the composite of available
literature by providing a contemporaneous analysis of Title I and its
application to these two additional debilitating mental illnesses.
A.

BipolarDisorderand Depression: A Growing Problem for America's
Workforce

Cicero observed, more than two thousand years ago, that "'the
diseases of the mind are more destructive than those of the body.."
Similarly, disability issues concerning workers who are mentally impaired are considerably more complex than those involving physical
impairments. 4 Furthermore, it is commonly believed that mental illness is rare. Such is not the case. Approximately two percent of
American adults have a serious mental illness." More specifically, the
-National Institute of Health estimates that more than 17.6 million
Americans suffer from some type of depression, including nine percent of the male work force and seventeen percent of the female

8 See Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to be Crazy to Work Here": Worker Stress, The Abusive
Workplace, and Title l of the ADA, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 795, 802 (1998).
Although schizophrenia would arguably serve as a better illustration of most of
the problems faced by employees with bipolar disorder and depression, there have
been very few Title I cases involving employees with schizophrenia, presumably because this mental disorder has a relatively low prevalence rate. (Schizophrenia afflicts approximately one percent of the population.)
10 See generally Wendy K. Voss, Employing the Alcoholic Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 33 WM. & MARYL. REv. 895 (1992).
1 See generally John M. Casey, From Agoraphobia to Xenophobia: Phobias and Other
Disorders Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 381
(1994).
12 See generally Haggard,
supra note 6.
Louis Pechman, Mental Disabilities in the Workplace, N.Y. L.J., March 2, 1994, at
1.

See id.
is See Industrial and Labor Relations Program on Employment and Disability,
Cornell University, Employing and Accommodating Workers with Psychiatric Disabilities
(visited Oct. 10, 1998) <http://www.janweb.icdi.wvu.edu/kinder/pages/psychiatric.html>.
14
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work force. Indeed, major depression and alcohol dependence are
the two most common psychiatric disorders. 17 These statistics are
particularly troublesome in the context of employment because the
first symptoms of mental illness usually surface "between the ages of
fifteen and twenty-five," a period during which most individuals are
receiving their vocational or educational training." Consequently,
the unemployment rate for these individuals is disproportionately
9
high - measured to be as much as seventy percent.
The quintessential guide used by "mental health professionals"20
in diagnosing mental illnesses is the Diagnostic and StatisticalManual
of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA). The purpose of this manual is to provide mental
health professionals with a uniform system of diagnosis. The current
version of the manual (DSM-IV) has been criticized because of its
complexity and because it is viewed
as functioning more as an ency2
clopedia than as a diagnostic tool.

1

The legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended courts to rely upon the DSM when interpreting this statute.2
Likewise, the EEOC recognizes the importance of this publication in
diagnosing mental impairments under the ADA. Not all conditions
16

See Kenneth E. Young & William H. Foster III, Stress and Mental Disorders in the

Workplace: Increased Focus Under the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 8 S.C. LAW. 33, 33
(Jul/Aug., 1996).
SeeJohn D. Thompson, PsychiatricDisorders, Workplace Violence and the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct, 19 HAMLINE L. REv. 25, 26 (1995).
18 Karen A. Guiduli, Challenges for the Mentally Ill: The "Threat to Safety"
Defense
Standardand the Use of Psychotropic Medication Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1149, 1155 (1996) (citing DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN ET
AL., THE ADA AND PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS
1,8 (1993)).
19 See id. (footnotes
omitted).
20 The following, among others, are considered "mental
health professionals" by
the DSM: psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, occupational and rehabilitation
therapists, and counselors. See DSM-IV, supra note 4, at xv.
21 See Karin Mika & Denise Wimbiscus, Responsibilities
of Employers Toward Mentally
Disabled Persons Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 11 J.L. & HEALTH 173, 175
(1996/1997) (citing Herb Kutchins & Stuart A. Kirk, DSM-IV: Does Bigger Mean Better?, HARV. MENTAL HEALTH LETTER (May 1, 1995)); see also David A. Larson, Mental
Impairments and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 48 LA. L. REv. 841, 850 (1988)
(criticizing the DSM-III-R (DSM-IVs immediate predecessor) because of the difficulty
of applying the APA's diagnostic criteria consistently). Even the Supreme Court has
recognized the "severe difficulties inherent in psychiatric diagnosis" faced by mental
health professionals. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 329 (1993).
2 See 135 CONG. REc. S11,174 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989). Senator
Armstrong declared: "A private entity that wishes to know what the [ADA] might mean with respect to mental impairments would do well to turn to DSM-III-R." Id.
23 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
EEOC ENFORCEMENT

1999]

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

1353

listed in the DSM-IV, however, are "mental disabilities" - or even
"mental impairments" - for purposes of the ADA.2 ' Nonetheless,
the legislative history does support the argument that Congress intended depression and bipolar disorder be classified as "mental impairments., 25 At this point, it is important to understand that simply
because a condition has been recognized as a mental impairment does
not necessarily imply that it is also a mental disability.2 Only if the latter is true will the employee possibly be entitled to the antidiscriminatory protections afforded by Title I.
1. Depression
The symptoms of depression include: "feelings of worthlessness
or helplessness, persistent and intense sadness, pessimism, social
withdrawal, inappropriate guilt, recurrent thoughts of suicide,
marked personality change, problems with sleeping or excessive fatigue, irregular eating patterns, difficulty concentrating, restlessness,
and anger out of proportion to the situation."07 The severity of this
mental illness should not be trivialized. As recognized by one court:
"[D]epression is 28a misleadingly mild term for an extraordinarily debilitating illness."
GUIDANCE:

THE AMERICANS wiTH DIsABILITIEs Acr AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILInIES 2-3

(1997) [hereinafter EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
24 See id. at 2. See infra Part II.B (discussing these
two terms).
25 According to the House Report:
It is not possible to include in the [ADA] a list of all the specific conditions, diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental
impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list, particularly in light of the fact that new disorders
may develop in the future. The term includes, however, such conditions, diseases and infections as: orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, infection with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus,
cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness,
specific learning disabilities, drug addiction, and alcoholism.
H.R. Rep. No. 101485, pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 333
(emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 450 (stating that physical or mental impairment "also means any
mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities") (emphasis added).
By "emotional illness," Congress is arguably referring to the conditions that
DSM-IV classifies as "mood disorders." Under DSM-IV, mood disorders include,
among others, depression and bipolar disorder. See supra note 4.
For an impairment to be elevated to the level of a disability, it must substantially limit the person's ability to perform a major life activity, such as working. See
infra Part II.B.
Guiduli, supra note 18, at 1154 n.15 (citing ZUCKERMAN ETAL., supra note 18, at
64-65).
Weiler v. Household Finan. Corp., No. 93 C 6454, 1994 WL 262175, at *3
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Depression is treated with a class of psychotropic medications referred to -

appropriately enough -

as "antidepressants."

These

drugs control the level of neurotransmitters in the brain and include
the following medications: tricyclics, monoamine oxidase inhibitors
and serotonin reuptake inhibitors. The common side effects of these
medications include "drowsiness, dizziness, dry mouth, blurred vision, nausea, and headaches." '
In addition to medication, depression is treated by other various
modes of therapy, including "cognitive therapy (focusing on thought
processes), behavioral therapy (working to establish adaptive habits),
interpersonal therapy (focusing on developing relationships with
others), psychosocial therapy (developing social and vocational
skills), and psychodynamic therapy (focusing on conflicts in the unconscious). ,,30
2. Bipolar Disorder
Bipolar disorder is considered "one of the most severe mental
illnesses.03 ' Bipolar disorder differs from depression "in that the individual experiences manic episodes" in addition to depressive episodes.2 These manic episodes consist of a euphoric state that can
lead the person to experience the following: "rushes of ideas or
thoughts, grandiose notions, extreme distractibility, abundant energy, increased risk-taking, rapid talking or fidgeting, and-a tendency
to act irrationally," overlooking the harmful or painful consequences
of such behavior.33 Many individuals suffering from bipolar disorder
can function well when treated with medication. It is important to
keep in mind, however, that whether or not an employee has a
"mental impairment" is to be determined without considering
the
mitigating effects of medication.3 4
(N.D. Ill.) (citing Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1992)).

Not everyone

agrees, however, as can be seen from the following representative comment: "Any
one of us can get a shrink to diagnose us as having a mood disorder .... The big
question in these [ADA] cases is where you draw the line between what constitutes a

disability and what doesn't." Mark Hansen, The ADA's Wide Reach, A.B.A. J. 14, 16
(Dec. 1993).
29 Guiduli, supra note 18, at 1161 n.51 (citing
ZUCKERMAN ETAL., supra note 18, at

68).

Id. at 1161 n.47 (citing ZucKRMsAr ETAL., supra note 18, at 69-70). A
full discussion of these various types of therapy is beyond the scope of this Article.
51 Miller, supra note 5, at 713 (citing ROBERTA G. SANDS, CLINICAL SOCIAL

WORK
PRAcTICE IN COMMUNITY MENTAL HALTH 183-86 (1991)).
32 Guiduli, supra note 18, at 1155
n.15 (citing ZUcKERmAN ETAL., supra note 18, at

65).

34
3See

EEOC,

ENFORCEMENT GuiDANCE,

supra note 23, at 6-8; see also, 29 C.F.R_ pt.
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Bipolar disorder is treated with the class of psychotropic medications known as "antimanics," the most common of which is lithium
carbonate.-" Lithium helps to subdue the mood swings experienced
by individuals suffering from bipolar disorder.- Common side effects of lithium include fatigue, cramps, and severe thirst." As a result, supplemental medication may be prescribed to counteract these
side effects. In addition, bipolar disorder may be treated with the
same alternative modes of therapy that are available to individuals
suffering from depression."
The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Promise of a New Erafor the
Disabled

B.

On July 26, 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act" to remedy, in part, what it perceived as employment discrimination against individuals with disabilities.4 ' However, Tide I
(the subchapter governing employment) did not become fully effective until two years later on July 26, 1992. Simply stated, the ADA "is
an antidiscrimination statute that requires that individuals with disabilities be given the same consideration for employment that indiA
,,42
The ADA is "designed to reviduals without disabilities are given.
move barriers which prevent qualified individuals with disabilities
from enjoying the same employment opportunities that are available
to persons without disabilities. 43 By "leveling the playing field" for
disabled individuals, Congress wished to eradicate the discriminatory
effects caused by employers "basing employment decisions on unfounded stereotypes."" The purpose of the statute makes clear that
Congress intended to include individuals with mental, as well as physi1630 app. (1998); S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at
52 (1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 334; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28-29
(1990), reprintedin, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 451. See also infra Part II.B.

s5See Guiduli, supra note 18, at 1161 n.52 (citing

ZUcKERMAN ET AL.,

supra note

18, at 68).
6 See id.
57 See
id.
s8 See id.

s9See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
40

42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213 (1998).

See id. § 12101; see also McCoy v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 933 F.
Supp. 438, 440 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Tenbrink v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 920 F. Supp.
41

1156, 1160 (D. Kan. 1996).
42

29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(a) (1998).

4sId.
44 Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 1995);
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 541 (7th Cir. 1995); see also

Dey v. Milwaukee Forge, 957 F. Supp. 1043, 1050 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
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cal, disabilities.4 5 Congress realized that, unlike individuals discriminated against on the basis of other factors, individuals with disabilities historically had little or no means of legal recourse.4 6 The ADA,
however, "does not guarantee equal results, establish quotas, or require preferences favoring individuals with disabilities over those
without disabilities. 4 7 Rather, it simply "requires employers to consider whether reasonable accommodation could remove the barrier"
presented by the employee's disability.48
The specific purpose of Title I of the ADA, as with the Rehabilitation Act of 197349 before it, is "to ensure that handicapped indiSee 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
See id § 12101(a)(4). One only has to look at the oft-quoted Supreme Court
decision in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), to see how our courts traditionally offered little protection to the mentally disabled. In Buck, the Supreme Court upheld
a Virginia law providing for the sterilization of the "feebleminded" because - referring to the plaintiffs family history of mental retardation - "three generations of
imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207; see also Guiduli, supra note 18, at 1152 n.10
(discussing commentary on the historical lack of protections for the mentally disabled and the stigma attached to those suffering from such disabilities).
47 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630
app.
45
46

48

Id.

The ADA shares its common substantive core with the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. Both statutes prohibit broad arrays of institutions from discriminating against
disabled individuals on the basis of their disability. In enacting the ADA, Congress
was partly responding to problems caused by inconsistent interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act and the inadequacies of that statute's protections. See McDonald v.
Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1995) (as to inconsistent interpretations);
Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. 883 F. Supp. 379, 387 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (as
See generally S. Rep. No. 101-116 (1989), reprinted in 1990
to inadequacies).
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267-602. Congress also wished to broaden the scope of coverage provided by the Rehabilitation Act beyond its limited applicability to federally funded
entities. The Rehabilitation Act primarily only afforded protection to government
(rather than private sector) employees. See Miller, supra note 5, at 704. Consequently, the substantive standards for determining liability are the same under both
statutes. See Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Thus, whether suit is
filed against a federally-funded entity under the Rehabilitation Act or against a private employer under the ADA, the substantive standards for determining liability are
the same."). As one court noted, "the ADA was patterned after the Rehabilitation
Act and has been interpreted in light of that statute." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 430 n.6 (W.D. Va. 1996)
(citing Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57 (4th Cir.
1995)). Therefore, ADA claims, to the extent possible, are to be adjudicated "in a
manner consistent with decisions interpreting the Rehabilitation Act." Ennis, 53
F.3d at 57; 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1998); see also Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31
F.3d 209, 213 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994).
Not everyone, however, agrees with the suitability of cases decided under the
Rehabilitation Act as precedent for ADA claims. See generally Miller, supra note 5
(pointing out statutory changes and differences in legislative intent, as well as the
discriminatory bias against mentally disabled individuals reflected in Rehabilitation
Act cases).
49
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viduals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others."50 Nonetheless, "[tihe
ADA is not a 'job insurance policy,' but rather a congressional
scheme for correcting illegitimate inequities the disabled face."5
The statute "is not designed 'to allow individuals to advance to professional positions through a back door. Rather, it is aimed at rebuilding the threshold of a profession's front door.""'5 Congress's intent was to afford relief only to those employees with disabilities who
are otherwise able to perform the "essential functions ,5 of the job
that they hold or seek.5
"

C. JudicialInterpretationof the ADA and the Role of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
The EEOC is responsible for enforcement of Title I of the ADA,
which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of disability.55 Section 106 of the ADA requires that the EEOC issue substantive regulations implementing Title I within one year after the date
the ADA was enacted (i.e., byJuly 26, 1991). The EEOC indeed published its final rules on this date, stating that they would become effective one year later on July 26, 1992. 5, These regulations were later
codified as Part 1630 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations

50 School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (quoted
by
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419,
429 (W.D. Va. 1996)); see also Galloway v. Superior Court of the District of Columbia,
816 F. Supp. 12, 20 (D.C. 1993). "The Rehabilitation Act was the first federal statute
to" provide "civil rights protections to individuals with disabilities." Miller, supra
note 5, at 704. In contrast to the ADA, however, this statute was limited to federal
employees and contractors as well as individuals receiving services from the federal
government. See id.; see also supra note 49.
51 Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., Inc. 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 1995);
see also
Bacon v. Great Plains Mfg., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 523, 528 (D. Kan. 1997).
52 Price v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F. Supp.
419, 421-22 (S.D. W. Va.
1997) (quotingJamie Katz &Janine Valles, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Professional Licensing, 17 MENTAL & PHYSIcAL DIsABIuTY L. REP. 556, 561 (Sept./Oct.
1993)). "The purpose of the ADA 'is to place those with disabilities on an equal
footing and not to give them an unfair advantage.'" Petition of Rubenstein, 637
A.2d 1131, 1137 (Del. 1994) (quoting D'Amico v. New York State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 813 F. Supp. 217, 221 (W.D.N.Y. 1993)).
See infra Part II.A.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1998); see also Vaughan v. Harvard Indus., Inc., 926
F. Supp. 1340, 1348 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
55 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1998).
42 U.S.C. § 12116.
57 See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. 35,726 (1991).
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(EEOC regulations).- Additionally, the rules contain an appendix,
which the EEOC intended to function as "interpretive guidance" for
individuals trying to comprehend and apply the EEOC regulations5 9
a daunting task at best. Congress's goal was that these regulations
be "comprehensive and easily understood."6 However, based upon
the subsequent plethora of cases that emerged calling upon courts to
interpret various terms and provisions contained in both the ADA
and the EEOC regulations, it is doubtful that this goal has been
reached.
In addition, as promised, the EEOC has generated a number of
"compliance manuals" to provide guidance on specific Title I issues.
Courts, in seeking guidance, may rely on the myriad guidelines and
technical manuals produced by the EEOC. 62 These manuals, though,
are not mandatory
authority, 63 i.e., the EEOC's interpretations are
"not controlling."''
Instead, they "constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance." 5
Congress specifically required that the ADA be interpreted in a
way that "prevents imposition of inconsistent or conflicting standards
for the same requirements" under the Rehabilitation Act.& As one
court noted, "In drafting the ADA, Congress drew upon and incorporated standards developed under the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore,
the ADA is to be interpreted consistently with the Rehabilitation
Act."' Courts may rely upon judicial decisions interpreting the Re29 C.F.R. § 1630.1-1630.16.
See id, pt. 1630 app. "This appendix represents the [EEOC's] interpretation of
the issues discussed, and the [EEOC] will be guided by it when resolving charges of
emgloyment discrimination." Id.
See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Re. 35,726.
58
59

R. See id.
62 See Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
See, e.g., Schluter v. Industrial Coils, 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
See id; see also Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 864 (1st Cir.
1998); Porter v. United States Alumoweld Co., 125 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 1997).
But see Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store of Del., 924 F. Supp. 763, 772 (E.D. Tex.
1996) (according much more deference to the EEOC guidelines, at least as to their
interpretation of the EEOC regulations). The Anderson court remarked: "[W]hen
an agency pronounces what its own regulations mean, that pronouncement is understood to be prima facie correct. What court would presume to tell an agency that
when it promulgated regulation X it did not really mean to do so?" 1d.
6
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; see also Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191,
199 n.12 (4th Cir. 1997); Porter,125 F.3d at 246.
42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1998).
67 Vande Zande v. State Dept. of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353, 359 (W.D.
Wis. 1994)
(citations omitted); see also Halperin, 128 F.3d at 197 n.7.
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habilitation Act when confronting similar questions under the ADA.6
Moreover, courts have consistently ruled that because of the ADA's
broad goals of eliminating discrimination against disabled individuals, "[t]he ADA must be broadly construed to effectuate its remedial
purpose."6
In 1994, a Congressional study directed that the EEOC provide
better guidance to employers concerning 'Job discrimination based
on psychiatric disorders.., since many EEOC field offices lack any
information on psychiatric disabilities."7 ° The study indicated that
the current levels "of assistance provided to employers and individuals with psychiatric disabilities is unlikely to" help implement the
ADA."1 It attributed this problem to several factors, "including the
complexity of psychiatric conditions, society's stigmatization of such
conditions, and the limited federal funding" allocated to eradicating
this type of discrimination under the ADA.72 The result of this push
for more guidance from the EEOC materialized on March 25, 1997,
when it published the EEOC Enforcement Guidance: The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct and PsychiatricDisabilities (hereinafter EEOC Enforcement
Guidance). Subsequently, these enforcement
guidelines were incor74
porated into the EEOC's Compliance Manual.

68 See id. For a commentary discussing why Rehabilitation Act cases
are not good

precedent for ADA claims, see generally Miller, supranote 5.
Lincoln CERPAC v. Health and Hosp. Corp., 920 F. Supp. 488, 497 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335 (1967); Civic Ass'n of the
Deaf v. Giuliani, 915 F. Supp. 622, 634 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Courts have recognized the
need to construe the ADA broadly: "The ADA is a remedial statute, designed to
eliminate discrimination against the disabled in all facets of society. As a remedial
statute it must be broadly construed to effectuate its purposes." Kinney v. Yerusalem, 812 F. Supp. 547, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 335).
70 CongressionalReport Calls for More Guidancefrom EEOC to Firms on Psychiatric
Disorders, DAILYLAB. REP. (BNA), March 22, 1994, at A-5.
71 Janet E. Goldberg, Employees with Mental and Emotional Problems
- Workplace
Security and Implications of State DiscriminationLaws, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct,
The RehabilitationAct, Workers' Compensation, and Related Issues, 24 STETSON L. REV.
201, 202 n.5 (1994).
Id. (citing U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PSYCHIATRIC
DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILmES ACT 13 (1994)).
73 It is unclear why the EEOC chose to use the term "psychiatric disabilities"
rather than "mental disabilities." However, the EEOC does state that the definition
of "mental impairment" found at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2) "also refers to mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, and specific learning disabilities. These additional mental conditions, as well as other neurological disorders such as Alzheimer's
disease, are not the primary focus of this guidance." EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GuIDANCE, supra note 23, at 2 n.6.
74 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE
MANuAL (1995).
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Neither the ADA nor the EEOC regulations attempt to enumerate every condition that constitutes either a physical or mental impairment "because it would be impossible to provide a comprehensive list, given the variety of possible impairments."7
Numerous
courts, however, have determined that depression and bipolar disorder are mental impairments that, given the right set of circumstances,
can be considered disabilities under the ADA. 76 Nonetheless, for the
reasons discussed in this Article, employees claiming discrimination
on the basis of a mental disability involving bipolar disorder or clinical depression have been mostly unsuccessful in litigating their
claims.
II.

SCOPE, COVERAGE, AND APPLICATION OF TITLE I OF THE

ADA

The rules of Title I can be succinctly summarized as follows: An
employer interacting with an individual who has a known disability,
but is qualified for a job and is capable of performing its essential
functions with or without reasonable accommodation, is prohibited
from discriminating against that individual and must provide reasonable accommodation unless it can establish that the individual poses
a direct threat or that the accommodation would create an undue
hardship. Currently, these rules only apply to employers with fifteen
or more employees. Title I's ban on discrimination is phrased as
follows:
No covered entity78 shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or

75 EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY

MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS

COMMISSION,

A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
(TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DIS-

ABILITIES ACT § 2.1 (a) (1992) [hereinafter EEOC,ASSISTANCE MANUAL].

See, e.g., Bombard v.Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 561 (7th Cir.
1996) (depression); Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1992)
(depression); Duda v. Board of Educ. of Franklin Park, 133 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir.
1998) (bipolar disorder); Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1081
(10th Cir. 1997) (bipolar disorder).
7
For the first two years after its enactment, the ADA was limited to employers
with 25 or more employees. See42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1998). As ofJuly 26, 1994,
the ADA is applicable to employers with 15 or more employees. See idt § 2000e(b).
Presently, an "employer" is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding year" with certain exceptions listed in 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(B). Id.§ 12111(5)(A).
78 "Covered entity" includes an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, orjoint labor-management committee. See id. § 12111(2).
76
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discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training,
of employment.9
and other terms, conditions, and privileges
The statute specifically lists seven types of conduct that an individual can use to show that an employer intended to "discriminate"
against him on the basis of a disabilityss Additionally, the EEOC
Id. § 12112(a).
90 [T]he term "discriminate" includes (1) limiting, segregating, or classifying ajob applicant or employee in
a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship
that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant
or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this
subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing
fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and apprenticeship programs);
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration (A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to
common administrative control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with
whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association;
(5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to ajob applicant or employee
who is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial
is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee
or applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection
criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test
or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be
job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business
necessity; and
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in
the most effective manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to ajob applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs
sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect
the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the
impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are the factors that the test purports
to measure).
Id. § 12112(b).
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regulations further explain what conduct that agency believes constitutes discrimination.81
Employees who believe that they have been discriminated
against because of their disability must do more than simply allege
such discrimination in order to litigate successfully a claim for violation of Title I. Although courts have failed to reach a consensus as to
the elements of a prima facie case, most likely a plaintiff-employee
will find it necessary to establish each of the following:
1. That he or she is disabled due to:
i.
an impairment which substantially limits a major life activity;
ii. a record of such an impairment; or
iii. having been regarded by his or her employer as having
such an impairment;
2. That he or she is qualified for the job (with or without reasonable accommodation); and
3. That he or she was discriminated against because of the disability n
Once the employee has established a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to challenge each of these elements and to assert any affirmative defenses. 83 All of these require81 See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.4 - 1630.13 (1998) (listing, as examples, limiting, segregating, or classifying employees based on their disabilities).
82 See generally Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566, 1578-79, 1579
(N.D. Ala. 1996). As a stark example of how the requirements for a prima facie case
remain unsettled, note the internal inconsistency within Pouncy. Compare id. at 157879 ("A plaintiff seeking relief under the ADA must establish that she is a disabled
person within the meaning of the ADA, that she is qualified to perform the essential
function of her job either with or without reasonable accommodation, and that she
was terminated because of her disability.") with id. at 1579 ("[A] plaintiff may prove
a prima facie case by showing (1) she was in the protected class; (2) she was discharged; (3) at the time of the discharge, she was performing the job at a level that
met her employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) her discharge occurred under
circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination,").
85 The seminal case governing the shifting burden of proof issue for Title I cases
is McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), as clarified by St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Courts originally applied the McDonnell Douglas
framework to claims brought under several other anti-discrimination statutes. In
recent years, however, courts began expanding the scope of McDonnell Douglas to
reach ADA cases as well. See Pouncy, 920 F. Supp. at 1579. Under this framework,
a plaintiff has the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.
If the defendant meets this burden of production, the
presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie case "drops
out of the picture," and the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that [he or] she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.
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ments, as well as possible affirmative defenses, are discussed in
greater detail infra.
A.

Who is a "QualifiedIndividual with a Disability"?: A Two-Step
Process

A "qualified individual with a disability" is entitled to reasonable
accommodation from his or her employer under the ADA. This term
specifically refers to "an individual with a disability who satisfies the
requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires,
and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of such position."4 In other words, the employee must be disabled, but not too disabled, i.e., not disabled to the
point that he or she cannot perform the job's essential functions
even with reasonable accommodation.8'
The "first step" (sometimes referred to in the case law as the
"otherwise qualified" requirement) of the analysis is "to determine if
the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position," such as appropriate education and employment experience. 6 The "second
step" is "to determine whether the individual is able" to perform the
"essential functions" of the position." "Essential functions" are defined by the EEOC regulations as those "fundamental duties of the
employment position." "'
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must present
evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the employer's articulated reason is pretextual by presenting concrete evidence in the form of specific facts that either show that a disability
played an impermissible role in the employer's decision or that the
proffered nondiscriminatory reasons are unworthy of credence.
Id. (citations omitted).
84 29 C.F.RI
§ 1630.2(m) (emphasis added).
85 As one commentator noted: "Indeed, mentally impaired employees often find
themselves in an 'inescapable quandary' because the very evidence which establishes
their disability also proves that they are 'not otherwise qualified."' Jeffrey I. Cummings et al., Personnel Update: An Employer's Duty to Accommodate Mental Illness in the
Workplace, SC40 ALI-ABA 263, 270 (1998) (citing Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134,
1137 (D. Md. 1988)). For example, one court determined that an employee did not
have standing to sue her employer because she asserted that her depression caused
her to be "completely disabled." See Morton v. GTE North, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1169,
1184 (N.D. Tex. 1996), affd, 114 F.3d 1182 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 205
(1997). Thus, she was not a qualified individual with a disability because she was
unable to perform the essential functions of her job, even with reasonable accommodation. See id. at 1180.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
87 Id
Id § 1630.2(n)(1). The EEOC's definition of essential functions reads:
In general. The term essentialfunctions means the fundamental job du-
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The purpose of this "second step" is "to ensure that individuals
with disabilities who can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired are not denied employment opportunities because they are not able to perform marginal functions of the position."8 Determining if a particular function is essential must be done
on a case-by-case basis and is highly fact specific." Furthermore, "It is
important to note that the inquiry into essential functions is not intended to second guess an employer's business judgment with regard
to production standards, whether qualitative or quantitative, nor to
require employers to lower such standards.""'
Essentially, then, to be a "qualified individual with a disability,"
the plaintiff must establish both that he has a disability and that he
can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reaties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or
desires. The term "essential functions" does not include the marginal
functions of the position.
(2) Ajob function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to the following:
(i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function;
(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of
employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and/or
(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in
the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the
particular function.
(3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but
is not limited to:
(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the
function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs.
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1991) which, in addition to a definition of
.essential functions" similar to that found in the EEOC regulations, provides:
For the purposes of [Title I], consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of ajob are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered
evidence of the essential functions of the job.
Id.
9 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep.
No. 101-485, pt. 2,
at 55 (1990), reprintedin, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 337.
90 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630
app.
91 Id.
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sonable accommodation." Although few courts have ventured so far
as to attempt to quantify this definition, one court found that an employee who was only able to perform fifty percent of his duties was
not a qualified individual with a disability. 9 Another case of particular relevance to this Article involved an employee who was incapable
of working for her employer because of her perfectionism and sensiThe court determined that she was not a
tivity to criticism.9
"qualified individual with a disability" because her mental disorder
could not be reasonably accommodated to enable her to perform the
job's essential functions. 5 Therefore, it is important to keep in mind
that although "the ADA focuses on eradicating barriers, [it] does not
relieve a disabled employee or applicant from the obligation to perform the essential functions of the job."'' In arguing a claim for violation of the ADA, plaintiff-employees must be careful not to admit
that their disability is so substantial that it prevents them from being
able to perform their job's essential functions even with reasonable
accommodation.
What is a Disability?

B.

There are three prongs to the ADA's definition of disability. An
employee is "disabled"98 if he satisfies the requirements of any one of
these prongs. The first prong concerns an employee who has "a
physical or mental impairmenri that substantially limits'00 one or more of
the major life activities' of such individual."'' 02 Notably, the requireSee Whillock v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1561 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
See Bivins v. Bruno's, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1558, 1562 (M.D. Ga. 1997).
94 See Waite v. Blair, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 460, 472 (W.D. Pa.
1995).
95 See id, at 471-72.
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1998).
97 See Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 1997); see also
Nguyen v.
IBP, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1471, 1485 (D. Kan. 1995).
98 The ADA uses the term "disabilities" in contrast to the Rehabilitation Act,
which uses the term "handicaps." Substantively, however, these two terms are
equivalent. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. The choice in phraseology merely reflects
the House Committee on the Judiciary's desire to adopt the more widely used term
at present. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 26-27 (1990), reprinted in, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N.; see also S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 21 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 pt. 2,
at 50-51 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 333.
See infra Part II.B.1.
10 See infra Part II.B.2.
101 The EEOC regulations and the regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act
both include similar definitions of "major life activities." See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
(1998); 34 C.F.R. § 104.504 (1998). This term refers to "functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working," 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), as well as "sitting, standing, lifting,
93
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ments of this prong can also be satisfied if the individual has
"multiple impairments" which combine to limit substantially one or
more major life activities. 3 The second prong pertains to employees
who can only show "a record of such an impairment."'0 4 Finally, the
third prong encompasses employees who are simply "regarded as

[and) reaching." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. This list, however, was intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. See id.The EEOC has added to this list by stating that the
abilities to interact with others, concentrate, and sleep are all major life activities.
See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANE, supra note 23, at 10-12. Regarding the first abil-

ity in this list - the ability to interact with others - the EEOC has stated that an
impairment substantially limits this major life activity only if the employee is significantly restricted when compared with the average person in the general population.
See id. at 10. Furthermore,
[slome unfriendliness with coworkers or a supervisor would not, standing alone, be sufficient to establish a substantial limitation in interacting with others. An individual would be substantially limited, however,
if [his] relations with others were characterized on a regular basis by
severe problems, [such as) consistently high levels of hostility, social
withdrawal, or failure to communicate when necessary.
Id. Nonetheless, at least one court has determined that the "inability to interact with
others does not implicate a major life activity." Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 928
F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Me. 1996), aff'd, 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997) (emphasis added).
In fact, the court even went so far as to claim that the "inability to get along with
others ...does not belong in this list of major life activities." Id.(referring to 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)); see also Part II.B.2, infra (discussing "major life activities").
Whether future courts will continue to follow Soileau's position on this point remains
to be seen, given that the decision was delivered before the EEOC Enforcement Guidance was published in March 1997. Recall, though, that the EEOC's guidelines are
just that - guidelines. They are not binding upon the courts. See supra Part I.C.
,0242 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A) (1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (emphasis added).
103 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630
app.

,0442 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (B); 29 C.F.RI § 1630.2 (g)( 2 ). The regulation
states:
The intent of this provision, in part, is to ensure that people are not
discriminated against because of a history of disability. For example,
this provision protects former cancer patients from discrimination
based on their prior medical history. This provision also ensures that
individuals are not discriminated against because they have been misclassified as disabled.
29 C.F.R1 pt. 1630 app.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 pt. 3, at 29 (1990), reprinted in,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 452; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485 pt.
2, at 52-53 (1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 334-335. "Records" include (but
are not limited to), education, medical, and employment records. See 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. The regulations continue:
This part of the definition [of disability] is satisfied if a record relied on
by an employer indicates that the individual has or has had a substantially
limiting impairment. The impairment indicated in the record must be
an impairment that would substantially limit one or more of the individual's major life activities.
Id. Note that "relied on by an employer" necessarily implies that the employer must
actually know of the employee's record of impairment. See Davidson v. Midelfort
Clinic, 133 F.3d 499, 510 n.8 (7th Cir. 1998).
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having such an impairment."'0 5 Note that the final prong protects
individuals who may not even have an impairment, let alone one that
is substantially limiting.'0 6 It is sufficient under this prong if the employee can prove that he or she was "perceived"'07 as having a substantially limiting impairment.'°
105

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (C); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3). "Regarded as having such

an impairment" refers to a person who:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially
limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation;
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major
life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in [29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1)
or 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (see infra note 118 and accompanying
text)] but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
For examples of conduct coming within each of these three parts of the third
prong, see 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. For example,
suppose an employee has controlled high blood pressure that is not substantially limiting. If an employer reassigns the individual to less strenuous work because of unsubstantiated fears that the individual will suffer a
heart attack if he or she continues to perform strenuous work, the employer would be regarding the individual as disabled," satisfying the requirements of subparagraph (1).
Id.
The rationale for the "regarded as" part of the definition of disability is the
same as that for its inclusion within the Rehabilitation Act. The Supreme Court, in
interpreting this definition of "disability" in the context of the earlier statute, determined that although an individual might have an impairment that does not in fact
substantially limit a major life activity, the reaction of others could prove to be just as
disabling. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987); see
also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. "Such an impairment might not diminish a person's
physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment." Arline, 480 U.S. at 283 (quoted at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.). By including this
language in the ADA, "Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and
fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations
that flow from actual impairment." Arline, 480 U.S. at 284 (quoted at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app.).
106 But see Fussell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1568 (S.D.
Ga. 1995),
affd, 106 F.3d 417 (11th Cir. 1997) (employees with a "perceived" impairment must
be substantially limited, the same as employees with a "real" impairment).
107 Courts often refer to the third prong using the
term "perceived" rather than
"regarded." See also supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
Courts have inferred that an employer perceives an employee as having a
mental impairment when the employer: (1) knows that the "employee has been diagnosed with a mental impairment," (2) knows "that the employee has taken extended leaves on account of a mental impairment," (3) receives "statements from
the employee to the effect that he is mentally impaired," (4) "inquires as to impairment-related absences," (5) "inquires as to whether the employee is having any
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Note that "disability" under the ADA is quite different from traditional notions of its definition. For instance, an employee claiming
that she was "totally disabled" and who therefore could not perform
anj work because of her clinical depression was found not to be disabled for purposes of the ADA.'" The reason: She was not a
"qualified individual with a disability" by virtue of the fact that she
was unable to perform the essential functions of her job even with
reasonable accommodation. 1 0
The EEOC regulations specifically remove certain conditions
from the definition of "disability."''
Included among these exemptions are the current use of an illegal drug 2 and the following conditions that otherwise might possibly be argued as constituting "mental
impairments" under the ADA:
(1)

Transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism,
voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from
physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders;

(2)

Compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or

(3)

Psychoactive substance use
disorders resulting from cur3
rent illegal use of drugs."

In addition, the EEOC regulations summarily conclude that
"[h] omosexuality and bisexuality are not impairments and so are not
disabilities."'l 4 Moreover, "individuals with common personality traits

'problems,'" or (6) refers "the employee to counseling or to an employee
program." Cummings et al., supra note 85, at 268 (citations omitted). An
is covered by this prong of the definition if he or she can show that the
"made an employment decision because of a perception of disability based
fear or stereotype'

. . .

assistance
employee
employer
on 'myth,

. If the employer cannot articulate a non-discriminatory rea-

son for the employment action, an inference that the employer is acting on the basis
of 'myth, fear or stereotype' can be drawn." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.; see also H.R.
Rep, No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30-31 (1990).
See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (W.D. Tenn.
1995), aff'd, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998); see also
supra note 85 and accompanying text.
"1
See Parker,875 F. Supp. at 1325; see also supra Part II.A (discussing "essential
functions"); infra Part II.C. (discussing "reasonable accommodation").
I See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3.
112 See id. § 1630.3(a).
11 Id. § 1630.3(d).
14 Id. § 1630.3(e).
Some members of Congress were concerned that the ADA
was a "homosexual rights bill in disguise." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 4, at 82, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565. Although the source of this concern is unclear, it
might possibly, albeit unjustifiably, emanate from the fact that "(p]ersons infected
with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus are considered to have an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity, and thus are considered disabled under"
the ADA. H.R Rep. No. 101485, pt. 3, at 28, reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 451.
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such as poor judgment or a quick temper are not" disabled."5 Similarly, generalized stress 6 from job or personal pressures, without
more, is not a disability."
1. "Physical or Mental Impairment""' 7
A physical or mental impairment is defined as follows:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs,
respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities."'
At first glance, it might appear that the EEOC intended subparagraphs (1) and (2) to be its definitions of "physical impairment" and
"mental impairment," respectively. Indeed, several commentators
and courts have mistakenly referred to subparagraph (2) as the definition of "mental impairment." ' 9 However, upon closer examination, it becomes clear that such a reference is in error. Consider, for
example, that a "physiological disorder" that affects the
"neurological" body system (subparagraph (1)) could nonetheless
manifest itself as a "mental illness" (subparagraph (2)), i.e., Alzheimer's disease.
Additionally, the EEOC specifically excludes the following conditions from the definition of impairment: (1) "physical characteristics," such as a person's eye color, hair color, or left-handedness; (2)
Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566, 1580 n.8 (N.D. Ala. 1996);
Greenberg v. New York, 919 F. Supp. 637, 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); see also 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app.
116 See EEOC, AssIsTANcE MANUAL, supra note 75, § 2.1(a)(i).
In contrast, stress
and depression that result from a documented physiological or mental disorder
would be an impairment (although not necessarily a disability). See id.
17
"Physical or mental impairment" is defined the same under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.; 34 C.F.R. § 104.504 (1998).
11
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
119See, e.g., Casey, supra note 11, at 389; Cummings et al., supra note 85, at 265;
Duda v. Board of Educ. of Franklin Park, 133 F.3d 1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 1998); Fenton v. Pritchard Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (D. Kan. 1996). In contrast, the
EEOC seems implicitly to recognize the applicability of subparagraph (1) to mental,
as well as physical, impairments. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 23,
at 2 n.6; see also DSM-IV, supra note 4, at xxi (discussing the difficulty of distinguishing mental disorders from physical disorders).
15
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"physical characteristics," such as "height, weight, or muscle tone that
are within 'normal' range and are not the result of a physiological
disorder;" (3) "characteristic predisposition to illness or disease;" (4)
conditions, such as pregnancy, which are not the result of a physiological disorder; (5) "environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantages such as poverty, lack of education, or a prison record;" (6) advanced age, except for "various medical conditions commonly
associated
with aging, such as hearing loss, osteoporosis, or arthri2
tis.

0

An issue left open by Title I's definition of impairment is
whether the effects of the individual's condition should be evaluated
after it has been treated with mitigating measures such as medication.
Both the legislative history and EEOC guidance strongly support the
position that the limitations of mental impairments should be evaluated without taking into consideration the mitigating effects of any
medication.121 Nonetheless, courts faced with this question have been
split in their decisions.'2 A survey of the cases, however, reveals that
those courts finding that the impairment should be assessed before
any mitigating measures have been implemented advocate the more
sound of the two positions. 23 As a related caveat, it should be noted
12

29 C.F.R_ pt. 1630 app.

1 See H.R. Rep. No. 101485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
451; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989); H. R. Rep. No. 101-485 pt. 2, at 52 (1990),
reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 334. In determining whether an impairment exists,
"mitigating measures," such as medicine and assistive or prosthetic devices, should
be disregarded. See id. "For example, an individual with epilepsy would be considered to have an impairment even if the symptoms of the disorder were completely
controlled by medicine." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h); see also EEOC, ASSISTANcE MANUAL,
supra note 75, § 902.5. Likewise, medication should not be considered in determining whether an individual is disabled. See EEOC, ASSISTANcE MANUAL, supra note 75,
§ 902.5.
1
See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 762-63 (6th Cir. 1997) for a list of
cases taking both positions.
125 For example, in Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854,
859 (1st Cir.
1998), the court found that "[a] reasonable person could interpret the plain statutory language [of the ADA] to require an evaluation either before or after ameliorative treatment." Therefore, the court looked to the legislative history for guidance.
In assessing the legislative history, the court determined that "the House and Senate
Committee reports explicitly state that, in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the impairment 'should be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-than-substantial limitation."' Id. at 859-60 (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 451).
Likewise, the Senate reported that a disability "'should be assessed without regard to
the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.'" Id. at 860 (quoting S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)). Based upon these
reports, as well as others, the Arnold court concluded that it is "abundantly clear"
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that simply because a person is taking medication does not necessarily mean that he or she is disabled - or even impaired. 24 For example, evidence that an employee has been prescribed Prozac is not, by
itself, conclusive proof that the employee has depression and,
thereby, a disability.
Courts have also recognized that a disability does not have to be
permanent.21 5 At the same time, however, intermittent and episodic
impairments usually do not suffice to constitute a disability, 6 presumably because the lack of continuity prevents them from being
"substantially limiting." This limitation on the definition of impairment presents a particularly difficult hurdle to be overcome by individuals with certain mental disorders, not the least of whom are those
suffering from bipolar disorder or clinical depression. According to
the DSM-I, more than fifty percent of individuals diagnosed with
major depression will eventually experience another major depresthat "disability" is "the underlying medical condition ... without regard to whether
'the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication.'" Id.
124 See i.
125 See Paterson v. Downtown Med. Ctr., 866 F. Supp. 1379, 1381 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
126 See Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir.
1995); see also Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 1995); Duff v. LobdellEmery Mfg. Co., 926 F. Supp. 799, 808 (N.D. Ind. 1996). According to the EEOC,
"temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or
permanent impact, are usually not disabilities. Such impairments may include, but
are not limited to, broken limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (emphasis added). The EEOC recently provided
guidance on this issue by presenting the following two relevant illustrations, the first
involving an employee suffering from depression and the second involving an employee with bipolar disorder:
Example A: An employee has had major depression for almost a year.
He has been intensely sad and socially withdrawn (except for going to
work), has developed serious insomnia, and has had severe problems
concentrating. This employee has an impairment (major depression)
that significantly restricts his ability to interact with others, sleep, and
concentrate. The effects of this impairment are severe and have lasted
long enough to be substantially limiting.
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 8.
Example B: An employee has taken medication for bipolar disorder
for a few months. For some time before starting medication, he experienced increasingly severe and frequent cycles of depression and mania; at times, he became extremely withdrawn socially or had difficulty
caring for himself. His symptoms have abated with medication, but his
doctor says that the duration and course of his bipolar disorder is indefinite, although it is potentially long-term. This employee's impairment (bipolar disorder) significantly restricts his major life activities of
interacting with others and caring for himself, when considered without medication. The effects of his impairment are severe, and their
duration is indefinite and potentially long-term.
Id at 8-9; see also EEOC, ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, § 902.4(d).
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sive episode and between twenty and thirty-five percent will experience a chronic course of the mental disorder, with periods of remission and recurrence. 2 7 Bipolar disorder exhibits similar cycles in the
course of its symptoms.128 Possibly in response to this problem, the
EEOC recently took the position that
[c]hronic, episodic conditions may constitute substantially limiting impairments if they are substantially limiting when active or
have a high likelihood of recurrence in substantially limiting
forms. For some individuals, psychiatric impairments such as bipolar disorder, major depression, and schizophrenia may remit
and intensify, sometimes repeatedly, over the course of several
months or several years.129
What seems to emerge from the EEOC regulations and guidance manuals is a distinction between "chronic" and "non-chronic"
impairments. Before the EEOCEnforcement Guidancewas published in
March 1997, this distinction may have been lost upon the courts. Indeed, until that time, the EEOC only referred to "non-chronic" impairments in its regulations.2 9
Nonetheless, although the EEOC's position may appear to offer
hope for employees with depression and bipolar disorder, three
things must be noted. First, the quoted EEOC Enforcement Guidance
language is somewhat noncommittal, i.e., use of the word "may"
rather than "will." Second, because the EEOC Enforcement Guidance
was only recently published, few reported opinions have paid homage to this material, and none have cited it in regard to this particular issue. For employees with depression or bipolar disorder, such
recognition seems to be imperative if they are to overcome the
"substantial limitation" hurdle. Otherwise, employers may continue
to argue -successfully that these diseases, albeit "mental impairments,"
are not "mental disabilities" because the afflicted employees experience remissions or because the disorders are cyclic in nature. Third,
31
recall that the EEOC's guidelines are nonbinding upon the courts.1
Consequently, it is possible that some courts will still use the courses
of these two mental illnesses as a basis for denying claims, employing
the following logic: no impairment, no disability, no recovery under
127
128
129

SeeDSM-IV, supra note 4, at 325.
See id. at 235.
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note

23, at 9 (emphasis added); see also

EEOC, ASSiSTANcE MANUAL, supra note 75, § 902.4(d); Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar
Exam'rs, 861 F. Supp. 512, 519 (E.D. Va. 1994) (ruling that the plaintiffs recurrent
maer depression could constitute a disability under the ADA).
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.
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the ADA. Once again, only future cases will reveal the willingness of
courts to accept the EEOC's position on this issue.
2.

"Substantially Limits" a "Major Life Activity"

The term "substantially limits" has two alternative definitions.
First, it refers to a physical or mental impairment that causes a person
to be "unable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform.' 5 2 This definition has been
interpreted as requiring the court "to compare an individual's impaired functioning with the functioning of most unimpaired people. '" 3 Second, it also refers to a physical or mental impairment
which causes a person to be "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which [he or she] can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner,
or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity."'
In determining
whether an individual is substantially limited, the courts consider the
following factors:
(i)
The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii)
The duration or expected duration of the impairment;
and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment.

35

These "economic impact factors are intended to ensure that the
business' size, type, sales, and relevant labor markets are not affected
by accommodations" that would "cause a financial hardship to the
operation of the business" or that would "fundamentally alter the nature of the business."'%
An important fact that must not be overlooked is that "[a]n illness cannot in and of itself be considered an impairment. Only its
symptoms and/or ramifications actually limit the inflicted person's

132
'3

1997).

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (1998).
Price v. National Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F. Supp. 419, 426 (S.D. W.Va.

29 C.F.1 § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
Id. § 1630.2 0)(2); see also id. pt. 1630 app.; EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE,
suPra note 23, at 6.
Peter D. Blanck, Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations Under the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Part I - Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 877,
898 (1997).
154

135
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ability to perform major life activities.' 3 7 In other words, it is insufficient for an employee to claim simply that he suffers from depression
or bipolar disorder.'3 ' The court will actually look at the underlying
symptoms and complications to determine if they substantially limit
the employee's performance of a major life activity. Consequently,
an employee's specific set of circumstances must be considered on a
case-by-case basis under the ADA. 3 9 In spite of the EEOC's guidance,
not all courts have followed this poliCy.1 40

Moreover, in a seemingly

self-contradictory maneuver, the EEOC has stated that the impairRodriguez v. Loctite Puerto Rico, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 653, 659 (D.P.R. 1997).
As the Rodriguez court noted, "For the plaintiff to ask the Court or the jury to simply
infer than [sic] a person with [an illness] is substantially limited in some life activity
goes against the very mission of the statute." Id. at 658. Rodriguez is in accord with
the EEOC regulations, which provide that
[t]he determination of whether an individual has a disability is not
necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the
individual. Some impairments may be disabling for particular individuals but not for others, depending on the stage of the disease or
disorder, the presence of other impairments that combine to make the
impairment disabling or any number of other factors.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j); see also Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959,
962 (7th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir.
1996); EEOC, ASSISTANcE MANUAL, supra note 75, § 902.4(c)(1).
1s8 See Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977
F. Supp. 226, 232 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
Compare Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 561 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that severe depression with psychosis constitutes a disability); Guice-Mills v.
Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that depression with anxiety, insomnia, and migraine headaches is a disability) with Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 968 F. Supp. 1026, 1035-36 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that employee's depression is not a disability). The reason the Bombard and Derwinski courts found a
disability, whereas the Sarko court did not, may stem from the fact that the employees in the former cases had other medical symptoms in addition to their depression,
causing those courts to be more inclined to find that their plaintiffs' depression was
substantially limiting.
139 See Adams, 977 F.
Supp. at 232.
140 See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 37 (D. Maine
1996),
aff'd, 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997). Nonetheless, it would be wrong to claim, as one
commentator has, that "[g]enerally, if a disorder is included in the DSM IV... the
courts will recognize a plaintiff's mental impairment as a disability." Paul I. Weiner,
Stress and Mental Disorder: New Responsibilitiesfor Employers Under the ADA, 586 PLI/Lit
453, 456 (1998). Neither the EEOC regulations nor the prevailing case law support
this statement. Weiner might have been correct if he had instead claimed that disorders included in the DSM-1Vwould be recognized as mental impairments. See supra
note 22. There is a critical distinction under the ADA between an impairment and a
disability. For the former to rise to the level of the latter, it must substantially limit
the person in his or her performance of a major life activity. Moreover, Weiner's
confusion surfaces again later in his article when he indicates that a case in which
the judge "observed that ...depression existed in degrees and that depression
should not be rendered a disability per se" was correctly decided. Weiner, supra, at
457-58.
137
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ment of being
HIV-infected automatically qualifies as "substantially
4
limiting." '

1

Although "major life activities" include such things as "caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working,"" 4 only the last activity - working
is of particular relevance to the scope of this Article.14s When the
major life activity that is substantially limited is "working," then the
term "substantially limiting" is further defined as follows:
(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in

the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation
in the major life activity of working.'4

141

See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. However, in fairness, it should be pointed out that

the EEOC's position on this issue is supported by the ADA's legislative history. See
supra note 114; see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998) (holding that
HIV may impair a major life function - procreation).
142 See supra note 101.
143 See infra Part III.B. (discussing why this major
life activity may be receiving an
undue amount of attention from courts and plaintiffs alike).
1
See, e.g., Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285
(11th Cir. 1997); Crumpton v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 963 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (N.D.
Ala. 1997); Motichek v. Buck Kreihs Co., 958 F. Supp. 266, 270 (E.D. La. 1996). Furthermore, "the inability to perform one aspect of ajob while retaining the ability to
perform the work in general does not amount to substantial limitation of the [major
life] activity of working." Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727 (5th Cir.
1995); see also Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 723 (2d Cir. 1994).
Therefore, "a person who merely cannot work on particular job(s) at particular
place(s) is not considered to be disabled. In order to establish a disability under
[the] ADA, the impairment must substantially limit employment generally." Patrick v.
Southern Co. Serv., 910 F. Supp. 566, 569-70 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). This facet of the "substantially limiting" requirement, however,
should not pose much of a problem for employees with bipolar disorder or depression. The mental illnesses from which these individuals suffer are usually so pervasive that they will affect more than "one aspect of a job." In fact, if anything, these
employees will likely be compelled to prove that they are not completely disabled,
thereby denying them designation as a "qualified individual with a disability." See
supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
Nor does the inability to work for a specific employer constitute a disability. See
Jerina v. Richardson Automotive, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 106, 109 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(citing Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 1996)).
The ADA does not protect people from the general stresses of the
work place. Everyone has encountered difficult situations in the working environment. Being unwilling or even unable to work with a particular individual simply is not the equivalent of being 'substantially
limited' in the major life activity of working.
Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., No. 93 C 6454, 1995 WL 452977 at *5 (N.D. Ill.
1995), affd, 101 F.3d 519 (7th Cir. 1997). The court's reasoning was that a disability
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(ii) In addition to the factors listed in, the following factors may
be considered in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of "working":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable
access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment (class ofjobs);145 and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs
not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within
that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various
classes).'46

Consequently, "an individual is not substantially limited in the major
life activity of working just because he or she is unable to perform a
particular job for one employer, or because he or she is unable to
perform a specialized job or profession requiring extraordinary skill,
prowess or talent.' 47 The inability to perform a "particular specializedjob" or a "narrow range ofjobs" does not constitute a substantial
limitation. 48 Although "an individual does not have to be totally unable to work... [he must be] significantly restricted in the ability to
perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes,
when compared with the ability of the average person with compara-

ble qualifications to perform those same jobs. '4 Indeed, if the person was "totally unable to work," he would, by definition, not be a
"qualified individual" because he would be unable to perform the

is part of a person and continues with him to his nextjob. See id. In contrast, a personality conflict is specific to the individual (i.e., employer or supervisor) who is
"causing" the problem and, therefore, is not a disability.
145 One example of "a class ofjobs" is "heavy labor jobs"
for which a person would
be substantially limited if a back injury prevented him or her from lifting heavy objects. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
146 Id § 1630.2(j)(3); see supra note 132 and
accompanying text. An example of
"a broad range ofjobs in various classes" is a person allergic to a substance found in
most high rise office buildings that causes breathing difficulties. This individual
would be unable to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes that are conducted in high rise office buildings. See id. § 1630.2(j).
4
Id. at pt. 1630 app.
48 See id.
149
Id.
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job's essential functions."'° In any case, as noted by one court, "The
15
ADA standard of a class or broad range ofjobs, is not easily met.' 1
C. What is a "ReasonableAccommodation"?
Neither the ADA nor the EEOC regulations define "reasonable
accommodation." Instead, these two bodies of law provide examples
of what Congress and the EEOC believe constitute reasonable accommodations. According to the ADA, "reasonable accommodation"
may include

(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 52
The language "may include" indicates Congress intended that the
enumerated examples not be exhaustive. Compare the EEOC regulations, which essentially reiterate the definition in the ADA, but add
the introductory language: "Reasonable accommodation may include
but is not limited to .... ",3
Consequently, neither the ADA nor the
EEOC regulations mandate any specific accommodation. Although
this lack of specificity might cause uncertainty for both employers
and employees, it is most likely the result of an effort to cover as
many individuals and circumstances as possible.""
The purpose of the reasonable accommodation requirement is
not "to place the disabled employee in a superior position;" rather, it
is to enable such employees to enjoy the same benefits and privileges
of employment as are enjoyed by employees without disabilities.5 5 In
addition, the policy of the ADA is to require that employers implement reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals, not to
force employers to implement accommodations the costs of which to

See supra Part IIA.
Vaughan v. Harvard Indus., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1340, 1347 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
15
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1998) (emphasis added).
15
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (2) (1998) (emphasis added).
15
See EEOC, ASSiSTANcE MANUAL, supra note 75, § 3.4; see also infra Part III.
155 Pegues v. Emerson Elec. Co., 913 F. Supp. 976, 981 (N.D. Miss. 1996).
150
151
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the employer
are out of proportion to the benefits reaped by the in56
dividual.

It should be noted that an employer is not required to reallocate
"essential functions" as a means of accomplishing a reasonable accommodation. 57 In addition, simply because an accommodation is
possible does not necessarily imply that it is reasonable.5 Furthermore,
even though an employer should first try to identify open positions
for which the employee is qualified and which have equivalent pay
status and conditions of employment, the employer is nonetheless
permitted to reassign the employee to a lower graded position if no
equivalent one is available. 59 In such cases, an employer need not
maintain the employee's current salary unless it maintains the sala6°
ries of other similarly reassigned employees who are not disabled.
At the same time, however, " [r] eassignment may not be used to limit,
segregate, or otherwise discriminate against employees with disabilities by forcing reassignments
to undesirable positions or to desig6
nated offices or facilities.'0

In looking at this list of possible reasonable accommodations,
note a possible problem with "reassignment to a vacant position."
The legislative history of this reasonable accommodation indicates
that Congress intended that it be used for employees who, "because
of disability, can no longer perform the essential functions of the
job."62 One commentator goes so far as to suggest that this purpose
reflects an internal contradiction within the statute and predicted
that it would lead to an onslaught of litigation. '6 Specifically, he
points out that if an employee is a "qualified individual with a disability, ' 64 an employer is prohibited from discriminating against such a
person on the basis of that disability.'6 He then continues his analysis by recognizing that an employer is simultaneously required to rea1

See Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 503, 513

(S.D.N.Y. 1995), afftd, 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996).
157 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
158 See Mohamed v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.,
905 F. Supp. 141,152 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
159

See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.; see also EEOC,

ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE,

supra note

23, at 28.

I' See id.
I 1 Id.

S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 26, 31-32 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt.
2, at 63
(1990).
162

16
See David Harger, Drawing the Line Between ReasonableAccommodation and Undue
Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Reducing the Effects of Ambiguity on
Small Businesses, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 783, 785-86 (1993).
164 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
(1998).
1
See Harger, supra note 163, at 786 n.20; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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sonably accommodate a disabled employee.'6 Up to this point his
analysis is correct; however, he then states that the statute specifies
"that reassignment to a vacant position is reasonable."' 167 The statutory language is not as conclusive as this commentator believes. In
fact, the remark reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of statutory
interpretation. Both Title I and the EEOC regulations governing this
issue use the word "may" to qualify their list of possible reasonable
accommodations. Neither Congress nor the EEOC mandate that
"reassignment to a vacant position" is obligatory if an employee has a
disability, i.e., there is a distinct difference between "may" and words
like "shall" and "must." Moreover, what constitutes a reasonable accommodation is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into
consideration the particular facts relevant to that individual's situation.'" Finally, the barrage of litigation on this issue that the commentator predicted has, to date, not come to pass.
D. Defensesfor Employers
As a first line of defense, an employer can rebut the plaintiffemployee's prima facie case by arguing that he failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish one of the elements listed in Part II.
If
such an approach proves unsuccessful, an employer may then proceed to proffer any one of a number of affirmative defenses:
1. Employee's Disability Not "Known" to Employer
The ADA does not require an employer to reasonably accommodate170 an employee with a disability of which the employer is unaware.
Courts have ruled that the burden is initially on the em-

See Harger, supra note 163, at 786 n.20; 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (5)
(A).
Harger, supra note 163, at 786 n.20 (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C.
§
12111(9) (B).
1CI

67

06 See infra note 180.
170

170

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. The regulation states, "It is unlawful for a covered

entity not to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified applicant or employee with a disability .... " Id.
(emphasis added). As poignantly stated by one court: "The ADA does not require
clairvoyance." Miller v. National Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1995). It
should be recognized that the EEOC believes that Miller was decided incorrectly.
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 20 n.48. In Miller, the employee's
sister repeatedly telephoned the employer, informing it that Miller was "mentally
falling apart" and that her family was trying to admit Miller to a hospital. See Miller,
61 F.3d at 629. Nonetheless, the court determined that the employer was neither
alerted to Miller's disability (bipolar disorder) nor to her need for reasonable accommodation. See id. at 630; see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
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ployee to bring the disability to the attention of the employer. 7 '
However,
"cases involving an alleged mental disability generally come about
after the employee has been discharged without any accommodation having been sought. In these situations, the employee usually asserts that [he or she] had a mental disability that was not
diagnosed during employment, but was nonetheless responsible
for the behavior that resulted in discharge. Despite no accommodation being sought while employed, these plaintiffs bring
causes of action under the ADA maintaining that the termination
was discrimination based on disability."' n
Such cases provide the employer with a ready-made defense, since
the employer cannot be said to have been aware of the employee's
purported disability.
This defense presents potential problems for employees with
mental illnesses because such individuals are understandably reluctant to disclose their conditions for fear of embarrassment or other
undesirable consequences. 7 3 The EEOC, though, steadfastly takes
the position that "it is the responsibility of the individual with a dis74
ability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed."'
Likewise, courts are disinclined to infer that an employee's mental
disability is "known" to the employer simply because the employee
exhibits abnormal or disruptive behavior. 7 5 Nonetheless, it might be
possible for an employee to argue successfully that the employer
came to "know" of the disability through means other than an affirmative disclosure by the employee. '76 For instance, observing that

171 See Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc. 93 F.3d
155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rochester Gen. Hosp., 977 F. Supp. 226, 235 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Lippman v.
Sholom Home, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 188, 192 (D. Minn. 1996).
17
Mika & Wimbiscus, supra note 21, at 179 (citations omitted).
173 See Pechman,
supra note 13.
174 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630
app.
175 See, e.g., Lippman, 945 F. Supp. at 192; Stola v. Joint
Indus. Bd., 889 F. Supp.
133, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). "An employer is not obligated to observe employees for
any behavior which may be symptomatic of a disability, and then divine that the employee actually suffers from a disability." Lippman, 945 F. Supp. at 192. Moreover,
"[e]mployers are not required to be clairvoyant as to hidden medical problems of
their employees and provide assistance where none is requested." Adams, 977 F.
Supp at 235; see also supra note 170.
One court found that an employee's symptoms were not "so obviously manifestations of an underlying disability that it would be reasonable to infer that [her]
employer actually knew of the disability." Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d
928, 932 (7th Cir. 1995). This decision leaves open the possibility that, given the
right set of circumstances, an employer could be presumed to have "known" of an
employee's disability.
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an employee limps might be sufficient to put the employer on notice
that the employee has a physical disability. Similarly, witnessing an
employee's unusual behavior might be an adequate basis upon which
to claim the employer had "constructive knowledge" of that employee's mental disability. Exactly how this knowledge requirement
is to be interpreted77 has yet to be resolved by courts construing the
EEOC regulations.1

Undoubtedly, employers are faced with a "Catch-22" because, on
the one hand, they are required to make accommodations for an
employee once they "know" of a disability, but, on the other hand,
they are simultaneously prohibited from inquiring as to a disability
which has not yet been disclosed. 78 From an employer's perspective,
walking the fine line between violating one section of the ADA as opposed to another is fundamentally unfair. At what point is an employer presumed to know that an employee has a disability? This
problem is especially acute when the disability results from a mental
impairment that does not
manifest itself in a way readily apparent to
7
the untrained observer.'

2.

,

Refusal of "Reasonable Accommodations"

In at least two cases, employees' failure to accept what the court
considered reasonable accommodations offered by the employer
caused them to be ineligible for classification as a "qualified individual with a disability." 80
177

In Fenton v. PritchardCorp., 926 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1996), an employee es-

sentially claimed, albeit unsuccessfully, that his employer should have known that his
disruptive behavior was caused by a mental illness. See id. at 1445. Moreover, at least
one case decided under the Rehabilitation Act indicates that an employer should
not only be held responsible for disabilities of which it has actual knowledge, but
also for disabilities of which a "reasonable person" would have known. See Nathanson v. Medical College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1381-83 (3d Cir. 1991). Consequently,
employers would be well-advised to determine early on whether an employee possesses a mental disability that is affecting his or her work and, if so, determine what
can be done to accommodate that disability. See Pechman, supra note 13.
178 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(c) (2) (A) (1990).
However, if an employee
has a known disability or an obvious one that appears to limit, interfere with, or prevent the individual from performing the essential functions of the job, the employer
may inquire as to how the employee would perform the functions with or without
reasonable accommodations. See Miller, supra note 5, at 710, (citing EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABITIES ACT OF 1990 111-7 (1996 rev.)).

See Part III infra, for a discussion of "hidden" mental disabilities.
190 See Willett v. Kansas, 942 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd, 120 F.3d
272 (1997); Hankins v. Gap, Inc., 84 F.3d 797, 801 (6th Cir. 1996). In Willett, a nurse
with lupus requested, as a reasonable accommodation, that her employer supply her
1
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"Undue Hardship" for Employer

Even if an employer's conduct otherwise constitutes discrimination under the ADA, such conduct will be protected if the employer
can prove that providing "reasonable accommodations" for the employee would create an "undue hardship."' 8' Basically, "undue hardship" refers to "any accommodation that would be unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter
the nature or operation of the business."'82 As discussed in Part
with a light-weight cart for dispensing medications and that it reassign her to a facility that would require less walking. See Willett, 942 F. Supp. at 1394. When Willett's
employer offered to make these accommodations, she refused to accept them. Consequently, the court found that, based upon this refusal, Willett was not a "qualified
individual with a disability." Id, at 1395 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d) (1998)).
In Hankins, an employee with migraine headaches requested as a reasonable
accommodation that she be transferred to either one of two other available positions. See Hankins, 84 F.3d at 799. Hankins believed that both of these positions
would be less stressful. See id, Her employer, however, contested this fact and
claimed that she should have made use of one of the other reasonable accommodations available to her such as medical leave, voluntary time off, and vacation time.
See id. at 801. The court agreed with Hankins' employer and consequently ruled
that by refusing these accommodations, Hankins was not a "qualified individual with
a disability." Id. at 802 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(d)).
181 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p).
182 Id. § 1630.2(p).
The ADA defines "undue hardship" as "an action requiring
significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in
[42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)]." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(p) (1998). The "factors" to be considered are the following:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under [the
ADA];
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in
the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; ,the effect on expenses and resources, or
the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of
the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of
its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such
entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12111 (10) (B); see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(p) (2).
The EEOC regulations add the following factor to this list: "The impact of the
accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility's ability
to conduct business." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v). This additional factor seems to
be particularly applicable to employees with mental illnesses. For instance, when an
employee suffering from bipolar disorder is experiencing a manic episode, the resultant behavior could obviously have an "impact on the ability of other employees
to perform their duties." Surprisingly, though, little judicial attention has focused
on this factor.
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IID.4., within this defense is a provision permitting employers to require that an employee "not pose a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals in the workplace. '' OssThe EEOC regulations indicate that an employer should work with the employee to determine what, if any, accommodations can be facilitated.8 4 In addition, the EEOC regulations list a host of factors to be considered in
determining if an "undue hardship" exists.lss At the same time, the
EEOC has stated that the following do not constitute an undue hardship: (1) disruption to employees caused by their fears or prejudices
toward the individual's disability as opposed to disruption caused by
providing the accommodation, or (2) the accommodation's negative
impact on the morale of other employees.'8 Although not acknowl§ 12113(b).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (3). The regulation states:

183 42 U.S.C.
184

To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be
necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive
process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the accommodation. This process should identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations
that could overcome those limitations.
Id. (emphasis added). "This process of identifying whether, and to what extent, a
reasonable accommodation is required should be flexible and involve both the employer and the individual with a disability." Id. at 1630 app. (emphasis added). Note
that the EEOC chose not to make it incumbent upon an employer to involve the
employee in determining what accommodation would be reasonable. Nonetheless,
when confronted with this situation, an employer might wish to consider the following: Generally, involving an employee in this process should help to stymie any potential ADA claims. However, when the employee in question is suffering from a
mental illness, such as depression or bipolar disorder, communication could understandably be quite difficult. In these situations, an employer may be well-advised to
opt for excluding the employee or only dealing with his or her legal representative,
if one has been designated.
Although one would like to believe that the EEOC had the foresight to avoid
the potential problems that could arise with mentally disabled employees if it had
mandated the process suggested by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (3), it is unlikely that this
was the case. Rather, the voluntariness of this provision is most likely an unintended
and fortuitous consequence of the EEOC regulations.
In any event, despite the EEOC regulations, one court held that an employer
was required to work with an employee suffering from bipolar disorder to determine
what accommodations would be reasonable. See Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996). The Bultemeyer court professed that
"[a]n employee's request for reasonable accommodation requires a great deal of
communication between the employee and employer." Id. The court continued its
opinion by recognizing that "[i]n a case involving an employee with mental illness,
the communication process becomes more difficult. [Nonetheless, it] is crucial that
the employer be aware of the difficulties, and 'help the other party determine what
specific accommodations are necessary.'" Id. (quoting Beck v. University of Wisc.
Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996)).
185 See supra note 182.
186 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15 (d); see also
supra note 182.
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edged by the EEOC, it is clear that these two exceptions have underlying implications for mentally disabled employees.'8 7 Furthermore,
with these exceptions, the EEOC is tacitly acknowledging Congress's
intent that the ADA eradicate the unsubstantiated myths and fears
surrounding mentally disabled individuals.'8
Decisions as to where the line is to be drawn between a reasonable accommodation and an undue hardship are to be made on a
case-by-case basis in which the accommodations are specifically tailored to ensure that an employee is able to perform the job's essential functions.189 Courts have drawn certain limits as to what constitutes reasonable accommodation, finding that the following would be
"unreasonable": (1) unpaid leave of an indefinite duration,' 9°
(2)
keeping an employee on unpaid leave indefinitely until a position
opens,'9 ' (3) creating a new position for a disabled employee, (4)
eliminating or reallocating "essential functions" of a position,9 (5)
providing an employee with the specific accommodation that individual requests,' 94 and (6) allowing employees to work only when
their mental or physical impairment permits. 95 This last rule obviously has particularly pertinent consequences for employees suffering from bipolar disorder or depression (not to mention mental dis187
88
189

See supra note 182.
See supra note 105.
See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. The regulation states,
This case-by-case approach is essential if qualified individuals of varying abilities are to receive equal opportunities to compete for an infinitely diverse range ofjobs. For this reason, neither the ADA nor [the
EEOC regulations] can supply the 'correct' answer in advance for each
employment decision concerning an individual with a disability. Instead, the ADA simply establishes parameters to guide employers in
how to consider.., the disabling condition involved.

Id.

See Hudson v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996).
See Monette v. Electric Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996).
192
See id. However, if an employer knows of a position for which
the disabled
employee is qualified and which will become available relatively soon, it might be
required to offer the position to that employee. See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)
app.). Still, the accommodation must not impose an undue hardship on the employer. SeeDey v. Milwaukee Forge, 957 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D. Wis. 1996).
1 See Hershey v. Praxair, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 429, 434 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
194 See Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Drydock Co., 949 F. Supp. 403, 408 (E.D. Va. 1996); Scheer v. City of Cedar Rapids,
956 F. Supp. 1496, 1501 (N.D. Iowa 1997). The employer need only provide a reasonable accommodation that is necessary to enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the job.
195
See Aquinas v. Federal Express Corp., 940 F. Supp. 73, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Complying with such a request would undermine the regular attendance that is an
"essential function" of almost any job.
190
191
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orders in general). Recall that these two mental illnesses can involve
periods of remission and that bipolar disorder, by its very nature, is
cyclic.'1 Consequently, such precedent presents just one more obstacle to be overcome by the mentally disabled employee.
In addition to the six limitations noted above, one court ruled
that a mentally impaired employee who engaged in misconduct was
not entitled to "another chance" as a reasonable accommodation.'97
4.

"Direct Threat to the Health or Safety of Other
Individuals in the Workplace '"98

a.

Threat to Others

"Direct threat," according to the EEOC, refers to "a significant
risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or
others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation. ' "'9 Determinations as to whether a direct threat exists are
to be "based on an individualized assessment of the individual's present ability to perform safely the essential functions of the job. This
assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best
available objective evidence. ' 2, °0 In its guidance materials, the EEOC
consistently restates that these determinations must be based on an
"individualized assessment" of the employee in question.20' With respect to the employment of individuals with mental disabilities, the
employer must identify the specific behavior that would pose a direct
threat.20 Employees do not pose a "direct threat" simply by virtue of
either having a history of mental disability or being treated for such a
disability.20 3 Additionally, although the "risk" is usually considered to
be part of the "qualified individual with a disability" requirement,

196 See supraPart

I.A.
See Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664, 666-67 (7th Cir. 1995).
,98See29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b) (2) (1998).
1 Id. § 1630.2(r). This principle is sometimes referred to in the literature as
the
"safety defense." See Guiduli, supra note 18, at 1165 n.71; see also Bryan P. Neal, The
ProperStandardfor Risk of FutureInjury Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Risk to
SeltorRisk to Others, 46 SMU L. REV. 483, 484 (1992).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
201 See generally EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GuIDANCE, supra
note 23, at 33-36.
202 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
203 See H.R_ Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45-46 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
468-469.
197
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some courts have bifurcated the two issues and addressed them separately.

204

In examining the legislative history pertaining to this section of
the ADA, it is interesting to note that, initially, Congress was primarily concerned with "threats of harm" resulting from communicable
diseases (i.e., AIDS), and not mentally ill employees who, for instance, may be prone to violence. 5 Nonetheless, common stereotypes of mentally ill individuals include the belief that they are more
likely to be violent than "normal" individuals. 20 6 The validity of this
popular perception is currently unsettled.2 7 As a result of these
stereotypes, this defense remains particularly problematic for employees with bipolar disorder or depression. In fact, most cases involving an issue as to whether an employee was a "direct threat" to
others concern individuals with some type of mental disorder.

See, e.g., Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1265 (4th Cir.
1995); Altman v. New York City Health and Hosp. Corp., 903 F. Supp. 503, 509-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 886 F. Supp. 1349, 1352-53 (W.D.
Mich. 1995), affd, 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 51 (1998). One
court noted that "[t] here may be other cases under Title I where the issue of direct
threat is not tied to the issue of essential job functions but is purely a matter of defense, on which the defendant would bear the burden." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997). (Recall that in order to be a "qualified individual with a disability," one must be able to perform the
job's essential functions.) In addition, another court has ruled that "'the essential
functions of any job include avoidance of violent behavior that threatens the safety
of other employees."' Boldini v. Postmaster General United States Postal Serv., 928
F. Supp. 125, 130 (D.N.H. 1995) (quoting Mazzarella v. United States Postal Serv.,
849 F. Supp. 89, 94 (D. Mass. 1994)). Consequently, the ADA "protects only
'qualified' employees, that is, employees qualified to do the job for which they were
hired; and threatening other employees disqualifies one." Palmer v. Circuit Court of
Cook County, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 893, reh'gdenied, 118 S. Ct. 1344 (1998).
205 See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45-46 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
468-69 ("During Committee consideration, this 'direct threat' standard was extended to all individuals with disabilities, and not simply to those with contagious
diseases or infections."); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-558 (1990) ("The Senate bill include [d] as a defense that a covered entity may fire or refuse to hire a person with a
contagious disease if the individual pose(d] a direct threat to the health and safety
of other individuals in the workplace." This bill was supplanted by the House
amendment which broadened the defense to cover "all applicants and employees,
not just to those with contagious diseases."); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2
(1990).
20 See Miller, supra note 5, at 727-28.
207 See id. at 728 (taking the position that there
is no scientific evidence to substantiate this characterization of the mentally disabled). But seeJohn Monahan, Mental Disorderand Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 1992 AM. PsYcHOLOGIST 511,
511 (April 1992) (claiming that there is a significant relationship between some types
of mental illnesses and violence).
204
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Determining whether an employee is a "direct threat" is conducted on a case-by-case basis..8 and is a matter for the trier of fact to
determine after weighing all evidence as to the nature of the risk and
its potential harm. 209 However, an employer is not required to wait
until an employee actually injures someone if that employee exhibits
work attributes that could cause an accident.2 10 Indeed, Title I clearly
states "that an individual shall not pose a direct threat" to others. 1
The ADA does not require that an individual do something that is a
direct threat, only that he or she "pose" a direct threat to others.
Furthermore, the employer must conduct an "individualized assessment" of the employee's ability to perform safely the essential functions of the job in question - mere speculation is not enough. 2 In
particular, "[flor individuals with mental or emotional disabilities,
the employer must identify the specific behavior on the part of the individual that would pose the direct threat. 21 1 Unfortunately, the
EEOC does not provide any further insight into just how specific the
specific behavior must be. Nonetheless, the EEOC regulations provide the following guidelines for making "direct threat" determinations:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm.2
As one court noted, "[t]he determination that an individual
poses a 'direct threat' must be based on an individualized assessment
of the individual's" present ability to perform safely the essential
functions of the job.21 5 This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge or on the best available objective evidence. 216

208

See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1998).
See Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir.

1996).

SeeJackson v. Boise Cascade Corp., 941 F. Supp. 1122, 1127 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1998) (emphasis added).
212 See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp.
1164, 1170 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
213 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (emphasis added). In contrast, "[f]or individuals with
physical disabilities, the employer must identify the aspect of the disability that
210
21

would pose the direct threat." Id.
214

Id. § 1630.2(r).

215Chrysler, 917 F. Supp.
2 6 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630

at 1170.
app.
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Additionally, in January 1992, the EEOC published A Technical
Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the ADA
(hereinafter EEOC Technical Manual). This manual expands on the
four factors listed above by requiring that an employer claiming that
an individual is disqualified for posing a "direct threat" do the following: (1) prove the existence of a significant risk of substantial harm,
(2) identify the specific risk, (3) establish that the risk is current and
not speculative or remote, (4) assess the risk on the basis of objective
medical or other factual evidence concerning the specific individual, 1 7 and (5) consider if the risk could be eliminated or reduced below the level of a "direct threat" by reasonable accommodation. s
Nonetheless, not all courts appear to abide by these requirements. Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County 1 9 is but one example.
The plaintiff in Palmersuffered from depression and a delusional disorder2 0 At work, she made various statements to coworkers, which
led to her termination.2 ' Palmer testified that only after another
employee had physically threatened her did she retort: "'Look, if you
m
don't leave me alone, I'm going to throw you out the window."'
She also told a different coworker that she was "'so sick' of [her su''
pervisor that] she 'could just kill her."'2
The court found that these
statements justified Palmer's employer deeming her a "direct threat"
to other employees and, consequently, terminating her.2'
The problem with the Palmer decision is that the court failed to
apply the requirements of either the EEOC regulations or the EEOC
Technical Manual. Specifically, there is no indication that the court
considered the "likelihood" or "imminence" of the potential harm, as
mandated by the EEOC regulations.2 5 Similarly, the court did not
This requirement was also addressed by the EEOC in its appendix to the
EEOC regulations. See id. at pt. 1630 app. Determining whether a person is a direct
threat to himself or herself must be based on "valid medical analyses and/or other
objective evidence . . . rather than on stereotypic or patronizing assumptions and
must consider potential accommodations." Id. By way of example, the EEOC provides the following interesting illustration: "[A] law firm could not reject an applicant with a history of disabling mental illness based on a generalized fear that the
stress of trying to make partner might trigger a relapse of the individual's mental
illness." Id.
218 EEOC, AsSIsTANcE MANUAL, supra note 75, § 4.5.
217

219

905 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Il. 1995), aff'd, 117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. de-

nied, 118 S. Ct. 893, reh'g denied, 118 S. Ct. 1344 (1998).
22 See id. at 501-02.
221 See id.
Id. at 501.
225
24
25

Id. at 502.

See id. at 510.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1998).
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query as to whether the potential harm was too "remote or speculative" as required by the EEOC Technical Manual.16 The court also did
not consider any "objective medical or other factual evidence;"' 7
rather, it based its decision solely on the subjective testimony of
Palmer's coworkers trying to recall statements that she made on prior
occasions. Finally, the court did not satisfactorily consider whether
the problem could
have been alleviated through "reasonable ac28
commodation.
The facts imply that Palmer only had a confrontation with two
other employees.2 9 To alleviate this conflict, Palmer's employer tried
to accommodate her by transferring her to another facility.2s Shortly
thereafter, Palmer encountered one of these individuals at her new
job location by chance, consequently renewing the hostilities that
previously existed. 23 ' The court accepted this fact as evidence sufficient to prove that Palmer's employer could not reasonably accommodate her,232 presumably because there were no additional locations
for her possible reassignment. What the court failed to recognize,
however, was that the employer transferred Palmer to this new location because it initially determined that she would be able to avoid
contact with the two employees who were the source of her troubles.
Therefore, the employer should have been estopped from later arguing that this option was no longer feasible. A far more just course of
action would have been for the court to order that a reasonable accommodation required the employer to prohibit these two employees from entering Palmer's newjob site, and vice versa.

n' See EEOC, ASSISTANcE MANUAL,

supra note 75, § 4.5.

See id. This requirement can be satisfied by documentation from a designated
health care provider, who is familiar with the disability involved or the individual in
question, that the employee is a "direct threat" to others. See id. In addition, "[an
employee's violent, aggressive, destructive or threatening behavior may provide
[factual] evidence" sufficient to fulfill this standard. Id. Arguably, Palmer's alleged
statements could constitute the "threatening behavior" to which the EEOC refers.
The more rational position, however, is that words alone are not enough to establish
a "direct threat." The court should have inquired into Palmer's past employment
and medical records to determine whether these sources of "objective" evidence, in
combination with her recent hostile outbursts, caused her to be a "direct threat" to
the other employees.
228 See Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 905 F. Supp. 499, 509-11 (N.D.
Ill.
1995), affd, 117 F.3d 351, 352 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 893, reh'g denied,
118 S. Ct. 1344 (1998).
29 See id.
2o See id. at 509.
231 See id.
232 See id.
27
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Based upon these observations, one can infer an inherent bias
by the court underlying its assessment of the facts. It is doubtful that
the court would have been as quick to judge a non-mentally disabled
employee a direct threat to coworkers based on such impassioned
statements alone. The Palmercourt, evaluating the employee's comments in the abstract, overlooked the fact that it is not unusual for
individuals to say that they are going to "kill" somebody without truly
intending to commit a homicide. If Palmer had been "normal," it
seems safe to predict that the court would reasonably have concluded
that such statements merely reflected the exasperation of a frustrated
employee - not the impending threats of a potentially dangerous
individual.
b.

Threat to Self

The legislative history of the ADA states quite clearly that Congress intended this section to cover only threats to others.233 Despite
this fact, a noticeable disagreement has arisen among the courts as to
whether an employer can avail itself of the "direct threat" defense if
the employee poses a threat only rto234himself or herself. For instance,
in Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., the court validated this defense
in regard to an epileptic employee whose illness, claimed his employer, prevented him from working safely around fast-moving press
rollers and conveyor belts.235
The courts are not wholly to blame for this confusion. In fact,
the problem stems from the EEOC itself, which (for some inexplicable reason) interpreted the ADA's undeniably lucid language2 36 as extending to threats of harm to oneself:
An employer is also permitted to require that an individual not
pose a direct threat of harm to his or her own safety or health. If
performing the particular functions of ajob would result in a high
probability of substantial harm to the individual, the employer
could reject or discharge the individual unless a reasonable ac233
See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45-46 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
468-69; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 56-57, 73-74 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 338-39, 356; S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 27 (1989).
2
97 F.3d 446 (1lth Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118 (1997).
23
See id. at 447.
2
42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) reads as follows: "The term 'direct threat' means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation." (emphasis added). How the EEOC interpreted this language to
include a risk to oneself remains a mystery. In the appendix to the EEOC regula-

tions, the EEOC conspicuously neglects to cite any statutory authority or legislative
history supporting its extrapolation, in stark contrast to the rest of its explanation of
the "direct threat" statutory provision. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1998).
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commodation that would not cause an undue hardship would
avert the harm. For example, an employer would not be required
to hire an individual, disabled by narcolepsy, who frequently and
unexpectedly loses consciousness for a carpentry job the essential
functions of which require the use of power saws and other dangerous equipment, where no accommodation exists that will reduce or eliminate the risk."37
Therefore, the official position of the EEOC seems to support
Moses. Nonetheless, another court determined that the EEOC's interpretation of "direct threat," as including one directed to the indiOtherwise, according to
vidual himself or herself, was untenable.
this court, it would render meaningless the statutory language: "of
other individuals. 2 3 9 Additionally, it would conflict with the definitional section of the ADA, which specifically refers to "the health or
safety of others."2

40

Furthermore, as noted by one commentator, the

EEOC's interpretation of the ADA may violate the "Chevron doctrine," which stands for the principle that a federal agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute must be accepted unless it is "'arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.' 24' The ADA's definition of "direct threat" as only a "threat to others" is anything but
ambiguous. Consequently, "the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress 2 42 in
applying the concept of "direct threat" to Title I claims.

237 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. In addition to directly contradicting the language of
the ADA and its legislative history, this opinion by the EEOC was generated despite
the fact that
[m]any disability rights groups and individuals with disabilities asserted
that the definition of direct threat should not include a reference to
the health or safety of the individual with a disability. They expressed
concern that the reference to 'risk to self would result in direct threat
determinations that are based on negative stereotypes and paternalistic
views about what is best for individuals with disabilities.
Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35726,
35730 (1991).
238 SeeKohnke v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 1110, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
259

See i& at 1111-12.

240

See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1998) (defining "direct threat").
See Guiduli, supra note 18, at 1176 n.130 (discussing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.

241

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
242 Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842-43.
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Common Aspects of Both "Threat to Others" and
"Threat to Self'

Regardless of which type of threat is involved or recognized by
the applicable jurisdiction, mere "speculation 2 43 or "slightly increased risk, 2 4 as to any potential threat caused by an employee's disability is not sufficient to constitute a "direct threat" - the risk must
be "significant."24 5 To summarize, if

an individual poses a direct threat as a result of a disability, the
employer must determine whether a reasonable accommodation
would either eliminate the risk or reduce it to an acceptable level.
If no accommodation exists that would either eliminate or reduce
the risk, the employer may refuse to hire an applicant or may discharge an employee who poses a direct threat.
5.

Other Defenses

There are other defenses available to an employer, including
those applicable to "religious entities '' 2 7 and one concerning
"infectious and communicable diseases. 2 4 A discussion of these defenses, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
III. PLAINTIFF-EMPLOYEES SUFFERING FROM BIPOLAR DISORDER,
DEPRESSION, AND OTHER MENTAL DISORDERS UNDER TITLE I:
ENDING THE LOSING STREAK

In surveying the cases involving mentally disabled employees
claiming protection by Title I, one cannot help but notice a common
aspect, to all these decisions: The employer usually wins.249 This
243

See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp.

1164, 1170 (E.D. Mich. 1996); see also 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (1998) ("[S]peculative
or remote risk is insufficient.").
244 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.
245 See id. "The risk can only be considered when it poses a significant risk, i.e.,
high probability, of substantial harm." Id.
46

Id.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c).
Seeid.§ 12113(d).
249
See generally Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595 (8th Cir.
1998); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135 (1st
Cir. 1997); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997); Siemon v.
AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 1997); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93
F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996); Webb v. Mercy Hospital, 102 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 1996);
Miller v. National Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627 (8th Cir. 1995); O'Neal v. Atlanta Gas and
Light Co., 968 F. Supp. 721 (S.D. Ga. 1997); Langford v. County of Cook, 965 F.
Supp. 1091 (N.D. Il. 1997); Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 968 F. Supp. 409 (S.D. Ind.
1997); Sarko v. Penn-Del Directory Co., 968 F. Supp. 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1997);Jerina v.
Richardson Automotive, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 106 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Pouncy v. Vulcan
247

24
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characteristic is particularly true when the mental impairment is the
result of either an employee's bipolar disorder or clinical depression."O However, in reaching these decisions, the courts have not always applied a uniform system of analysis.
A. Judicially Constructed Obstacles Commonly Faced by Mentally Ill
PlaintiffEmployees and the Need for FurtherGuidancefrom
Congress and the EEOC
Courts commonly justify their decisions against mentally disabled employees in one of six ways. First, courts sometimes find that
an employee's disruptive behavior or other misconduct (even with
reasonable accommodation) prevents him or her from being able to
perform the job's "essential functions. 2 5' Thus, they are not qualified individuals. Many of these decisions have occurred even in cases
in which the employees had medically diagnosed mental disorders.
Second, courts occasionally find that an employee is not disabled because the claimed disability results from difficulties related
to a particular supervisor.252 As noted in Misek-Falkoff v. International

Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ala. 1996); Fenton v. Pritchard Corp., 926 F.
Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1996); Motichek v. Buck Kreihs Co., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 266
(E.D. La. 1996); Husowitz v. Runyon, 942 F. Supp. 822 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Kotlowski v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 922 F. Supp. 790 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); McCoy v. Pennsylvania
Power and Light Co., 933 F. Supp. 438 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Smith v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
No. H-94-2381, 1996 WL 437458 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 1996); Henry v. Guest Services,
Inc., 902 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1995); Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 905 F.
Supp. 499 (N.D. Ill.
1995); Stola v. Joint Industry Bd., 889 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. N.Y.
1995); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 875 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Tenn. 1995).
But see Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 916 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich.
1995).
250 See Cody, 139 F.3d at 598 (depression); Amego, 110 F.3d
at 148-49 (depression);
Soileau, 105 F.3d at 14 (depression); Siemon, 117 F.3d at 1176 (depression); Taylor, 93
F.3d at 164 (bipolar disorder); Webb, 102 F.3d at 959 (depression); Miller, 61 F.3d at
630 (bipolar disorder); Leisen, 968 F. Supp. at 416 (depression); Sarko, 968 F. Supp.
at 1034-35 (depression); Jerina, 960 F. Supp. at 109 (depression); Motichek, 958 F.
Supp. at 269 (depression); Husowitz, 942 F. Supp. at 832-33 (bipolar disorder); Kotlowski, 922 F. Supp. at 797 (depression); Henry, 902 F. Supp. at 251 (depression);
Palmer, 905 F. Supp. at 506-07 (depression); Parker, 875 F. Supp. at 1326
(depression). But see Collins, 916 F. Supp. at 642-43 (depression).
See, e.g., Amego, 110 F.3d at 147-48 (employee's depression caused her to be
unqualified to perform essential job function of administering and monitoring residents' medication); Kotlowski, 922 F. Supp. at 798 (employee's depression, which
caused her to be unable to arrive at work on time, prevented her from being able to
perform her job's essential functions); Palmer,905 F. Supp. at 508-09 (employee with
depression who repeatedly made abusive comments to other workers could not perform her job's essential functions).
252 See, e.g., Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., No. 93 C 6454, 1995 WL 452977, at
*5
(N.D. Ill.
July 27, 1995).
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Business Machines, Co.,2 53 "it is certainly 'a job-related requirement'

that an employee, handicapped or not, be able to get along with coworkers and supervisors. ' , 2" Decisions such as Misek-Falkoff have been
made despite the EEOC's guidance that interacting with others is a
major life activity. 5 Nonetheless, a person "is not substantially limited just because [he or she] is irritable or has some trouble getting
along with a supervisor or coworker.-2

6

Also, a noticeable discrep-

ancy in the case law - possibly indicating ajudicial bias against mental illnesses - is apparent when one compares these illustrative cases
with Gilday
v. Mecosta Count2 57 and Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook
25
County.
In Gilday, the court found that an employee with diabetes who
was having trouble getting along with others might be substantially
limited in the major life activity of working because mostjobs require
259
the ability to get along with others.
Consequently, the courts in
Weilert and Gilday, faced with similar sets of circumstances, reached
opposite conclusions as to this issue.
In Palmer,Judge Posner, writing the opinion for the Seventh
Circuit, concluded that "if a personality conflict triggers a serious
mental illness that is in turn disabling, the fact that the trigger was
not itself a disabling illness is no defense. Schizophrenia and other
psychoses are frequently triggered by minor accidents or other
sources of normal stress. 2 61 Depression and bipolar disorder can
similarly be triggered by these same factors.262 Moreover, one commentator opines that "the very few psychiatric disability cases that
survive motions to dismiss or for summary judgment are cases in
which the disability either clearly does not arise from the work environment at all or arises
from some physical and non-personal aspect
'
263
of the employment.
253

25
255

854 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Id.at 227.

See, e.g., Soileau, 105 F.3d at 15; Emberger v. Deluxe Check Printers, 1997 WL

677149, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1997); Breiland v. Advance Circuits, Inc., 976 F.
Supp. 858, 863 (D. Minn. 1997); see also EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note

23, at 5.
2
27

EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 5 n.15.

124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).

117 F.3d 351 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 893, reh'g denied, 118
S. Ct.
1344 (1998).
2

259
260
261

262
263

See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 765.

See supra note 252 and accompanying text.

Palmer, 117 F.3d at 352.
See Stefan, supra note 8, at 814 n.125 (1998).

Id. at 814-15.
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Third, tribunals also hold that the ability to withstand a stressful
work environment is an "essential function" of the job. Therefore,
an employee
lacking this ability is not a qualified individual with a
264
disability.

Fourth, courts either refuse to consider, or flatly reject, the employee's proposed reasonable accommodation.2
Fifth, courts often find that many mental illnesses are "hidden."
Although an employer cannot terminate an employee "solely" because of his or her disability, an employer can terminate an employee
whose unknown illness manifests itself in objectionable job conduct.
In such circumstances, it would be unreasonable to expect an employer to have "known" of the employee's disability. 2 6 If an employer
is unaware that the employee has a disability, it can easily argue that
it terminated an employee for non-discriminatory reasons. For instance, even if an employee with a mental disability, such as bipolar
disorder, can perform the essential functions of a job, the employer
can terminate him or her for consistently unacceptable behavior that
stems from the mental disability - a disability unknown to the employer.2

67

The employer was not aware of the disability; therefore, it

could not have been the "sole" reason for terminating the employee.
Many commentators who have written articles concerning mentally disabled employees and the ADA discuss how mental disabilities,
in contrast to their physical counterparts, are often "hidden., 269 In
264

See, e.g., Mundo v. Sanus Health Plan of Greater N.Y., 966 F. Supp. 171, 173

(E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[A] n inability to tolerate stressful situations is not an impairment
for purposes of the ADA."); Dewitt v. Carsten, 941 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (N.D. Ga.
1996), affd mem., 122 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that stress caused by only
one job does not constitute a disability). Courts usually deliver these decisions
couched in the framework of generalizations and do not examine the underlying
causes of the stress on an individualized basis, in contravention of the ADA's requirements. See Stefan, supra note 8, at 805. Consequently, they fail to address
whether the particular "stressor" is essential to the employee'sjob. See id.
265 See, e.g., Lewis v. Zilog, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
In Lewis, an
employee suffering from bipolar disorder requested a transfer to one of her employer's other offices. See id. at 941. After reviewing this request for a reasonable
accommodation, the court ruled that the "transfer [was] unreasonable as a matter of
law." Id. at 946. In the court's opinion, even with a transfer, the employee would
have been unable to maintain a regular level of attendance at work. See id.
266 SeeLandefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178,
1181 (6th Cir. 1993).
267 See id.; see also Mary E. Sharp, Note, The Hidden
Disability that Finds Protection
Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Employing the Mentally Impaired, 12 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 899, 916 (1996).
NA
See Landefeld, 944 F.2d at 1181.
269 See, e.g., Guiduli, supra note 18, at 1157-58; ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at
22; Paul F. Mickey & Maryelena Pardo, Dealingwith Mental DisabilitiesUnder the ADA,
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other words, they claim that mental illnesses usually do not have
overt manifestations. However, the author of this Article is dubious
of such generalizations, particularly when considering the more severe mental illnesses such as bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, and
major depression. Anyone who has observed a delusional or paranoid schizophrenic would likely scoff at the notion that such a mental disorder is in any way inconspicuous. In contrast, the real problem with mental disorders, when compared to physical disabilities, is
that the former are often much more difficult to diagnose.2

70

Simply

because a mental illness is more difficult to diagnose, however, does
not necessarily imply that it is elusive. Mental health professionals
may not agree upon

-

or even know -

the correct label for a pa-

tient presenting a particular set of symptoms. Nonetheless, when
somebody is suffering from a severe mental illness such as schizophrenia, it should be apparent that the individual is suffering from
some mental disorder, albeit one that might not lend itself to easy diagnosis. Despite this fact, at least one court has determined that unless an employer has been put on notice by an employee, it is not re"whether... [the] behavior was the product of
quired to determine
27
a mental disorder."

Sixth, courts are often all too eager to accept an employer's
statutorily sanctioned defenses that a mentally disabled employee either posed a direct threat to the safety of others in the workplace 27 or

that accommodating the employee would create an undue hardship.272
In addition to these six judicially constructed barriers faced by
all mentally disabled employees, those suffering from bipolar disorder or depression must surmount two additional obstacles. First, because these two mental illnesses often undergo periods of remission,
such individuals may have trouble overcoming precedent holding
that intermittent and episodic conditions are not impairments for
purposes of Title I, particularly if the jurisdiction does not give much
credence'to the EEOC guidelines on this subject.274 Second, because

of the seriousness of these two mental illnesses, individuals afflicted
with them will find it difficult to argue successfully that they are
"qualified individual[s] with a disability." In other words, the manifestations of these disorders might be so pervasive that no reasonable
9 LAB. LAW. 531, 533 (1993).
270
271

See Guiduli, supra note 18, at 1157-58.
Stola v. Joint Indus. Bd., 889 F. Supp. 133, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

272
2

See supra Part II.D.4.a.
274 See supraParts II.D.2., 3.

See supraPart II.B.1.
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accommodation would enable the individuals to perform their jobs'
essential functions. Also, the side effects of medication used to treat
these diseases could likewise impede the ability to carry out jobrelated functions. 75
Even though the growing body of Title I case law weighs heavily
against employees suffering from bipolar disorder or depression, it is
the ADA and the EEOC regulations themselves that are these individuals' primary adversaries. The problem is twofold. First, employers are uncertain of when their obligations under these two bodies of
law are called into action. Second, employees cannot be sure if anything less than telling an employer outright that they have a mental
disorder will suffice for protection. In addition, many employees
choose to conceal their mental illness, hoping that they can manage
to perform their jobs adequately. They are concerned that, if they
disclose their illness, they will be providing their employers with an
easy means by which to justify their subsequent termination, i.e., that
they cannot perform their jobs' "essential functions."
Ironically, this confusion and skepticism expressed by employers
and employees alike is a byproduct of the legislative and administrative intent behind the ADA and the EEOC regulations, respectively.
Both bodies of law are purposefully vague in order to permit
"flexibility., 2 6 However, at least in regard to the persistent quandary
faced by employers and employees as to what constitutes a mental
impairment (not to mention what constitutes a mental disability),
this intent seems less justified given the recent advances made within
the mental health profession to achieve uniformity in diagnosing
mental illnesses. 77 More specificity from either Congress or the
EEOC would also help to eliminate malingering by persons Congress
never intended to be afforded Title I protection. Two commentators, Mika and Wimbiscus, suggest as a possible remedy that an employee claiming to have a mental disability be required to supply his
or her employer with a documented diagnosis by a mental health
professional, which, most importantly, includes proposed accommodations for that employee.278 There are two benefits to this proposal.
First, it would enable courts to dismiss suits in which the employee
asserts an undiagnosed ailment while employed and then attempts

275
276

464.
277
278

See supra Part I.A. (discussing medication side effects).
See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 41 (1990), reprinted in, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
See supra Part I.A. (discussing the DSM).
See Mika & Wimbiscus, supra note 21, at 190; see also EEOC, ENFORCEMENT

GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 23.
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medical validation after termination.
Second, it would eliminate
the need for employers to guess as to what are the appropriate measures necessary to rectify an employee's disruptive behavior.20
Although the commentators' proposal offers obvious benefits, it
carries with it several problems as well. First, it places the entire burden on the employee, which may be particularly inequitable when
considering the vulnerable and fragile state of many individuals with
mental disorders. Moreover, as discussed aboveY one of the reasons
employees choose not to disclose their mental disorder is the stigma
that society still attaches to these types of medical conditions. 2 Second, the proposal presumes that employees are sufficiently cognizant
of the fact that they have a mental illness and, as a result, seek medical treatment. In contrast, persons suffering from depression or bipolar disorder are not necessarily the first to realize they have a condition that requires medical attention, partly because the onset of the
symptoms may be gradual. Moreover, individuals afflicted with more
serious psychoses (such as delusional schizophrenia) might have such
a distorted perception of reality that they will never fully comprehend the 2nature of their mental illness, even after seeking medical
treatment.

83

Mika and Wimbiscus also point out the "Catch-22" faced by employers: On the one hand, an employer violates the ADA if it fails to
make reasonable accommodation for an employee whom it "knows"
has a disability. On the other hand, an employer is prohibited from
inquiring as to such disabilities. 4 To remedy this situation, they suggest that "the statute should be amended to absolve an employer
M See Mika & Wimbiscus, supra note 21, at 190.
280
281
282

See id.
See supra note 46.
The results of one study ranked attitudes about disabilities from least stigma-

tized to most stigmatized as follows: ulcers, arthritis, asthma, diabetes, heart disease,
amputation, blindness, deafness, stroke, cancer, old age, paraplegia, epilepsy, dwarfism, cerebral palsy, hunchback, tuberculosis, criminal record, mental retardation,
alcoholism, mental illness. SeeJohn L. Tringo, The Hierarchy of Preference Toward Disability Groups, 4 J. SPECIAL EDUc. 295 (1970) (cited by Miller, supra note 5, at 705)
(presumably, "criminal record" was included as a reference point). Miller points out
that "[a]cceptance of people with major mental disorders may pose the greatest
challenge to the ADA's nondiscrimination mandate." Miller, supra note 5, at 705
n.28. This attitude is in stark contrast to the empathy most persons naturally express
toward persons with physical disabilities, such as deafness, blindness, or an amputation. Consequently, social attitudes toward the mentally disabled must change before the remedies sought by the ADA can be fully realized. See id.
283 See supra, notes 269-71 and accompanying text (discussing the
position of
some commentators that such mental illnesses are often "hidden").
294 See Mika & Wimbiscus, supra note 21, at 190.
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from liability for asking about a disability, or should more clearly apprise the employer when it is obligated to inquire whether an individual requires an accommodation." 2' A less complicated answer,
however, would be for the EEOC simply to define the term "known"
as that word is to be applied in section 1630.9(a) of its regulations.
B.

Reformulating the Legal Strategy of Plaintiff-Employees with
BipolarDisorderor Depression

Changes to the statute and the EEOC regulations, however, are
not the only possible mechanisms by which to ensure that Title I's
protections are fully extended to individuals with bipolar disorder
and depression, as Congress intended. The author has emphasized
throughout this Article that, even under the law as it currently exists,
future plaintiff-employees can restructure their legal strategy in order
to obtain better results when litigating Title I claims.
First, as was discussed in Part II.B.2., most employees bringing
these claims argue that they are substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. The EEOC regulations and guidelines, however,
make it clear that working is only to be considered as a major life activity if none of the other enumerated activities are substantially limited by the employee's impairment. In this regard, the EEOC has
stated:
Most of the discussion and analysis of the concept of substantial
limitation has focused on its meaning as applied to the major life
activity of working. This is largely because there has been little
dispute about what is meant by such terms as "breathing,"
"walking," "hearing," or "seeing" but much dispute about what is
meant by the term "working." Consequently, the determination
of whether a person's impairment is substantially limiting should
first address major life activities other than working. If it is clear
that a person's impairment substantially limits a major life activity
other than working, then one need not determine whether the
impairment substantially limits the person's ability to work. On
the other hand, if an impairment does not substantially limit any
of the other major life activities, then one must 7determine
whether the person is substantially limited in working.2
Id. One of the reasons for this proposal, according to the commentators, is
that "mental disabilities are rarely obvious .... " Id. The author of this Article disagrees with this generalization. Some of the behavioral manifestations of the more
common mental disorders (i.e., depression, alcoholism, and schizophrenia) are anything but elusive. See also supra notes 269-71.
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See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (1998).
EEOC, AssIsTANcE MANUAL, supra note 75,

§ 902.4(c) (citations omitted); see
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In other words, an employee should rely on working as a major life
activity only as a last resort, This is sound advice from the EEOC,
considering that, in addition to the somewhat uncertain definition of
"working," it is comparatively difficult to prove that this activity is substantially limited.2 Regrettably, most plaintiffs suffering from bipolar disorder or depression have failed to heed this advice from the
EEOC, choosing instead to focus their litigation on this one major
life activity - much to their peril.2 89 Such an approach is unwise for
several reasons, most notable of which is that the EEOC Compliance
Manual states: "Mental and emotional processes such as thinking,
concentrating, and interacting with others are other examples of major life activities.""o Undoubtedly, an individual suffering from depression or bipolar disorder, particularly without the benefit of
medication, will be substantially limited in the major life activities of
either "thinking" or "concentrating," and possibly both29 Additionally, the EEOC considers "sleeping" to be a major life activitym - an
activity that is disrupted by both depression and the depressive episodes of bipolar disorder.259 Consequently, employees with bipolar
disorder or depression should reevaluate their choice of major life
activities with this thought in mind. Selecting a major life activity that
also EEOC, AssIsTANcE MANUAL, supranote 75, § 2.2(a) (iii).
2N See supra Part II.B.2. (discussing the factors to be
considered in determining
whether an employee is substantially limited in the major life activity of working).
289 Bacon v. Great Plains Mfg., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 523 (D.
Kan. 1997), is one example. In Bacon, the employee apparently left it to the court to decide what major life
activity was substantially limited by his depression. Consequently, to Bacon's detriment, the court focused on the major life activity of working. See id. at 530. Also,
the court only cursorily addressed the other major life activities listed in the EEOC
regulations (i.e., walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, and learning), concluding that none of these activities was substantially impaired by Bacon's depression. See id. at 528, 529. Noticeably absent from the court's discussion are the other
major life activities listed in the appendix to the EEOC regulations (i.e., sitting,
standing, lifting, and reaching) and the EEOC Enforcement Guidance (i.e., interacting
with others, concentrating, and sleeping). See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app.; EEOC,
ENFORcEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 10-12. (Admittedly, this last source of
guidance was not published until after Bacon was decided. Nonetheless, recall that
the list of major life activities found in the EEOC regulations was not meant to be
exhaustive, such that the Bacon court could have considered these other activities.)
The facts disclose that Bacon's mental illness was causing him to have marital and
other family problems as well as persistent difficulty in getting along with coworkers.
See id. at 526-28. If Bacon had emphasized these problems, he possibly would have
been more successful in arguing that he had a "disability" under the first prong of
that term's definition. See supra Part II.B.
20 EEOC, ASSISTANE MANuAL, supra note 75, § 902.3(b); see also EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 23, at 10-12.
2
See supra Part I.A. (discussing the symptoms of these two mental disorders).
See supra note 101.
29 See supra Part I.A. (discussing the symptoms of these two
mental disorders).
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is medically recognized as being hindered by both of these mental
illnesses (i.e., sleeping, thinking, or concentrating) should enable future plaintiff-employees to achieve more successful results under the
ADA.
Second, employees suffering from bipolar disorder or depression should make better use of the third prong of the definition of
disability, i.e., that their employers "regard" or "perceive" them as
having a disability.2 All too often, employees take the more difficult
route, from an evidentiary perspective, of trying to prove that they
are actually disabled. In contrast, it is much easier to prove that an
employer regarded an employee as disabled because this prong of
the definition targets the myths and prejudices that the ADA sought
to eradicate - yet that still prevail in society today. For instance, the
EEOC gives an example in which an employee seeks counseling from
a psychologist for a condition that does not constitute a disability under the ADA.2 5 Upon learning of her consultation, the employer
terminates her under a false pretext, believing "that anyone who sees
or has seen a psychologist 'must be crazy."'" Therefore, according
to the EEOC, the employee "is covered by the third part of the definition of 'disability,' because she is being treated by her employer as
though she has a substantially limiting impairment although, in fact,
she does not."0 7 Although not indicated by the EEOC example, the
one potential problem with this course of action is proving an employer's true motivation in firing a specific employee. However, persons with deeply rooted prejudices such as these seldom keep their
opinions to themselves. Thus, it may just be a question of either finding a sympathetic coworker who is willing to testify against the employer or locating a "smoking gun," such as an internal memorandum or document in a personnel file memorializing the employer's
discriminatory actions.
Third, employers often raise the defense that an employee's
mental disability was not "known" to them and therefore they were
not required to accommodate the disability. However, as discussed
in Part II.D.I., the employee suffering from bipolar disorder or major depression should make a "constructive knowledge" argument
when confronted with this defense. These two mental illnesses, as
well as the other severe mental disorders, manifest themselves with
such obvious signs that employers cannot in good faith claim they did
24
"5

See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
See EEOC, ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 75, § 902.8 (Example 2).

2%Id.
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not know that an employee suffering from one of these diseases was
burdened with a "mental limitation."2
Fourth, when employers submit a defense that an employee with
bipolar disorder or depression is a "threat to others" in the workplace, the employee should first objectively determine whether there
is a basis for such a claim, i.e., does he or she have a history of threatening coworkers or a medically documented propensity toward violence.2 Even if there is such a record, the employee might try to argue, through the use of expert witnesses, that current therapeutic
interventions (e.g., medication) can successfully prevent this past behavior from reoccurring. Thus, the employee has the "present ability
to safely perform the essential functions of the job" and, consequently, the employer's defense is unsubstantiated.
Fifth, if an employer propounds the related defense that an employee with bipolar disorder or depression was a threat to himself or
herself, the employee should raise a constitutional argument under
the Chevron doctrine.3so The EEOC's institutionalization of this defense is arguably at odds with Supreme Court precedent dictating the
scope of federal agencies' authority to interpret statutes.
Sixth, these employees should more aggressively challenge the
defense often argued by their employers that accommodating their
disabilities would cause an "undue hardship." Other than the few instances in which the safety of other employees is a genuine concern,
employers are primarily wary of the expense such accommodations
may impose upon them. s2 However, a study conducted by the Department of Labor found that most reasonable accommodations for
mentally disabled employees would cost little. s 3 Specifically, the
study determined that fifty percent of the accommodations for menSee 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a) (1998); see also supra note 170.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
3 I&
s01 See supraPart II.D.4.b.
One commentator has opined that an inherent problem with the undue hardship defense is that "[a]ttitudes about the cost-effectiveness of accommodations by
employers... often have more to do with unfounded beliefs than with the actual
qualifications of persons with disabilities or their ability to add to employers' economic value." Blanck, supra note 136, at 897; see also id. at 897 n.100 & 899 n.111
(citing studies supporting the author's position). Consequently, courts will need to
examine carefully this defense on a case-by-case basis to ensure that employers really
are confronted with an "undue hardship" as Congress originally envisioned that
term's definition.
s03 See Haggard, supra note 6, at 369. Note that this study was conducted as to accommodations provided pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, not the ADA. Nonetheless, the accommodations provided under the earlier statute would be very similar to
those required by the ADA.
2_
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tally ill employees cost nothing and only twenty-two percent cost
more than $500.s A criticism of this study is that it neglected to consider the prolonged leaves of absences that might be required of employees with mental disorders30 This criticism was particularly directed at mood disorders such as depression and bipolar disorder.
As such, this criticism may no longer be valid for several reasons.
First, there are many medications available that control the "peaks"
and "troughs" experienced by individuals with bipolar disorder and
the malaise endured by those who suffer from depression.m Second,
with the increasing penetration (or "infestation," depending upon
one's perspective) of managed care, there is an increased emphasis
on outpatient treatment to control escalating health care costs - including those for treating the mentally ill. Therefore, prolonged
hospitalization is quickly becoming a characteristic of a foregone era.
IV. CONCLUSION

As the tide of this Article suggests, employees with bipolar disorder or depression continue to wage an uphill battle for protection
under Tide I of the ADA. This unfortunate situation emanates partly
from a lack of clear guidance from either Congress or the EEOC.
Additionally, the pervasiveness in society of the myths and prejudices
surrounding mental illness have undoubtedly infiltrated the courts as
well, impermissibly swaying judicial decisions in favor of employers.
However, Congress, the EEOC, and the judiciary are not wholly to
blame for plaintiff-employees' lack of success in litigating Tide I
claims. Much of this problem can be negated by future plaintiffs implementing the legal strategies discussed in Part III.B. Nonetheless,
as seen in the aftermath of other governmentally imposed antidiscrimination measures, no innovative legal tactics or procession of
victorious lawsuits are likely to reshape society's attitudes toward the
mentally ill. Consequently, the unfortunate reality is that mentally
disabled employees will never realize the equal treatment that was
3o
See id. Additionally, a more recent study of the ADA found that nine percent
of all accommodations made under that statute ranged from $2,001 to $5,000 while
another five percent cost employers more than $5,000. See Steven B. Epstein, In
Search of a Bright Line: Determining Wen an Employer's Financial Hardship Becomes
"Undue" under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 48 VAND. L. REv. 391, 394 (1995).
This study apparently did not attempt to distinguish between accommodations provided to mentally disabled employees and those provided to the physically disabled.
Therefore, its validity in specifically predicting the costs likely to be incurred by employers accommodating mentally disabled employees pursuant to the ADA is questionable.
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See Haggard, supranote 6, at 369.

3W See supra Part I.A. (discussing of the treatment of these two disorders).
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like "mental illness"
Congress's goal in enacting the ADA until labels
7
and "mentally ill" no longer carry a stigma.1
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See supra notes 46, 282.

